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Demons, Spirits, and Elephants:
Reflections on the Failure of Public
Administration Theory1
Melvin J. Dubnick – University of New Hampshire
For the past half-century, those defining the field of Public Administration in their role
as its leading “theorists” have been preoccupied with defending the enterprise against
the evils of value-neutral logical positivism. This polemical review of that period focuses
on the Simon-Waldo debate that ultimately leads the field to adopt a “professional”
identity rather than seek disciplinary status among the social sciences. A survey of recent
works by the field’s intellectual leaders and “gatekeepers” demonstrates that the antipositivist obsession continues, oblivious to significant developments in the social
sciences. The paper ends with a call for Public Administrationists to engage in the
political and paradigmatic upheavals required to shift the field toward a disciplinary
stance.
Keywords: Disciplinary Communities, Public Administration Theory, Simon-Waldo
Debate
Author’s Note: This paper was originally written and presented in 1999 as both a critical
reflection on Public Administration’s ongoing “identity crisis” and a rather (often too harsh)
assessment of several recently published works that seemed exemplary of the problem being
highlighted. Although some aspects of the argument made in the paper did find an outlet (see
Dubnick, 2000), its length and contentious tone meant it was unlikely to find a mainstream
outlet for publication. Nevertheless, it did circulate among colleagues and generated some
collegial and published reaction (see Bogason et al., 2000). Eventually relegated to a location
at the author’s website, it continued to circulate via intermittent downloads, with notable
increases in “hits” at the beginning of each academic term. It seems that over the years it
became required reading in a number of doctoral seminars at various institutions, and as
some graduates of those programs have taken up positions at other institutions, the paper’s
life and influence (for good or bad) has been sustained.
With the advent of online journals such as the Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs (JPNA),
it became logistically possible to consider publishing a lengthy piece such as “Demons…,” and I
was pleasantly surprised when the editors approached me about revisiting the paper for
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possible publication. As flattering as the suggestion seemed, the prospect of undertaking what
might be regarded as the longest “revise and resubmit” in history was daunting, not merely
due to the length and complexity of the paper and its thesis, but also because my views of the
field and works (and “gatekeepers”) I critiqued have modified and mellowed somewhat. What
we did agree on was to have JPNA publish the original paper (with a few very minor tweaks)
along with some external commentary. The result is that what you are about to read has not
been “updated” as to facts, and especially as to opinion; moreover, you will not find a
reference in the bibliography more recent than 1999. That said, I hope some of the arguments
offered can still prove valuable to those who, like me, are committed to the future of our field.
The Ongoing Identity Crisis
Those of us engaged in the study of Public Administration2 have grown accustomed to the idea
that we have an identity problem. Metaphorically, an optimistic view of this “identity crisis”
would stress the idea that such conditions arise during periods of adolescence — thus holding out
the promise of a productive future once such youthful anxieties are overcome. But our identity
problem has proven more resistant and enduring. Following the metaphor of developmental
psychology, our youthful identity crisis has matured into a full-blown mid-life crisis (see King,
1999) — without the relief from some of the emotions and anxieties that normally might
accompany the intervening years.
“Identity crisis” has been one of several labels used to characterize the field’s problems. I could
just as conveniently have called it an “intellectual crisis” (Ostrom, 1974), a “paradigmatic
quandary” (Henry, 1987), or a “shifting” among “competing visions” (Stillman, 1991). There is a
danger inherent in such diagnostic commentary, especially when applied haphazardly — as
former President Carter found out after declaring that the American nation was suffering from a
“malaise.” So at the outset of this essay, I want to be clear that my focus is on those academics
who (1) define their primary scholarly interests as the activities, tasks, and functions of those
engaged directly or indirectly in the administration of government programs and policies, and
(2) perceive themselves as part of a distinct sub-community within academe known as Public
Administration.3
The idea of “community” is significant in this context. It is a word often tossed out without
discussing the implications of its use. Obviously, the use of the term is metaphorical; any
community of students and scholars lacks the boundaries and the degree of social interaction
among its members found in "real world" communities. Nevertheless, such communities do
exist and have consequences for their members and neighbors. In that respect, they are similar
— although clearly nowhere equivalent — to what Benedict Anderson terms “imagined
communities” in his now classic discussion of nationalism. A nation, according to Anderson, is
“imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of
their communion.” It is “imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality
and exploitation may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
comradeship” (Anderson, 1991, p. 6-7). In the case of nations, an imagined community is
something its members would support by putting their lives on the line. In the case of a “selfaware” group of scholars, it is a community around which they are willing to build their
professional lives.4
One implication of this approach is that I base the following remarks on the assumption that a
self-aware community of scholars and students already exists. Thus, the community of Public
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Administration precedes, suffers from, and attempts to deal with the identity crisis. There are
times in its past (and perhaps in its future) when such crises and quandaries help to define the
field. However, I presume that its existence as a community does not depend upon or await
resolutions of the debates that characterize the field.
A second implication is that Public Administrationists are not unique in having to face such
difficulties. There are lessons to be learned from the experience of other imagined communities
in the hard sciences (Polyani, 1964) as well as the professions (see Sullivan, 1995). All have gone
through (and many are still going through) similar crises, and have emerged from the
experience significantly altered, if not transformed.5
It must be stressed as well that this paper is about the identity crisis among those who explicitly
regard themselves as members of the Public Administration community. There are scholars
who conduct studies of public administration and bureaucracy (thereby meeting our first
criterion) who do not regard themselves as members of the Public Administration academic
community. Instead, they might identify themselves as political scientists, sociologists, social
psychologists, administrative scientists, or as members of any of the other imagined
communities found in the broader academic community. While others may characterize these
individuals as “public administration scholars” based on the subject matter of their work, they
take their professional cues and standards from their respective academic fields rather than
from Public Administrationists. In this paper, I am concerned with those who associate
themselves clearly with the field of Public Administration.
This paper is more specifically about a prominent group among the field’s self-identifiers who
have acted as the intellectual agenda-setters and “gatekeepers”6 and whose recent work
represents efforts to deal with the identity issue through action (in the form of published
research), reflection and theory. I use the term “theorists” for this group, although some would
deny the appropriateness of the label to what they do. My use of the term is not limited to
individuals who explicitly engage in the articulation of philosophical frameworks and empirical
models related to public administrative behavior. Rather, I cast a wider conceptual net to
capture those who have addressed issues related to the nature of the field and its activities. My
focus in on the failure of these theorists – in their role as the field’s agenda-setters and
gatekeepers – to provide the Public Administration community with a consensus upon which to
construct a disciplinary identity as a social science.
The two major premises of this paper – that Public Administration requires a consensus, and
that such a consensus should focus on the field’s status as a social science discipline – are
necessarily risky assumptions, and therefore beg for clarification at the outset. They are “risky”
in two respects. First, they imply a pre-judgment of both the present condition of the field as
well as a normative position regarding its future direction. My prejudice in this regard is clearly
against the current ambivalence among Public Administrationists regarding their identity, and
for the acceptance of disciplinary status in the social sciences. Second, these assumptions also
imply a historicist approach to questions about the nature of the field. That is, I accept the idea
that academic fields are subject to developmental patterns generated by historical and
institutional forces. Given the critical purpose of this paper, however, the risks associated with
both assumptions seem justifiable.
The Need for Consensus
The building of and striving for consensus is central to understanding the history of
contemporary academic disciplines. This is especially true for Public Administration, for the
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lack of a formidable consensus within the field generates the anxieties that we call its identity
crisis.
The emergence of academic fields (see Ross, 1979) often starts with little more than a sense of
common concerns among a group of scholars who initially identify with other disciplines.
Building on this self-awareness, the group reaches a point where they seek to articulate an
explicit identity differentiating themselves from other scholars. Roger Smith notes that scientific
fields often achieve this with the establishment of an “origin myth”: “Origin myths create a
sense of identity, and this is as true for a scientific as for any other community. A group which
struggles to establish itself, whether an oppressed nationality or a science with little institutional
standing, may particularly emphasize a moment of birth and a founding father” (Smith, 1997, p.
492). For psychology, the myth was constructed around German philosopher Wilhelm Wundt’s
creation of a laboratory for experimental studies of the mind. American political scientists cite
historian Francis Lieber’s efforts to foster public instruction in government during the 1850s.
And most Public Administrationists in the United States note the 1887 publication of political
scientist Woodrow Wilson's “The Study of Administration” as the watershed event upon which
common identity is built.7
The developing field also adopts a “canon” – that is, a body of “exemplary texts” providing
intellectual standards for the community of scholars to focus on as they build their relationships
and literature (see Schaffer, 1996). For psychology, the canon ranges from the writings of
behaviorist John B. Watson to the works of Sigmund Freud. In political science, the works of
writers such as John W. Burgess, Woodrow Wilson, W. W. Willoughby, and Frank J. Goodnow
formed the early canon. For Public Administration, by the early 1930s the emerging Canon
included not only the writings of Goodnow and textbooks by Leonard D. White and W. F.
Willoughby, but commission reports and government documents as well. Wallace S. Sayre
acknowledged the canonical nature of that material, noting that they “not only provided the first
effective teaching instruments for the new field of study; they also codified the premises, the
concepts, and the data for the new public administration” (Sayre, 1958, p. 175).
Building on these intellectual and social foundations, the consensus eventually takes
organizational form. Disciplinary associations, such as the American Psychological Association
and the American Political Science Association, are more than manifestations of disciplinary
consensus. In the United States, most were formed between 1890 and 1905 (Ross, 1979). They
become part of a now institutionalized consensus that sustains the field despite internal
differences that characterized it at the time of the organization’s founding, or those that might
emerge in the future. Although no substitute for intellectual agreements or shared canon in the
long-term, associations can serve as common ground even in the midst of paradigmatic
revolutions.
The founding of the American Society for Public Administration was somewhat uncharacteristic
in two respects. First, it was formed some 40 years after the creation of most major social
science associations. Second, the energy and initiative for creating ASPA came primarily from
practitioners and researchers not affiliated with academic institutions. Although the formal
record indicates that academics played a significant role in the organization’s founding,8 a
detailed narrative by one of its founders indicates a more complex history involving leaders
from public and private government research bureaus as well as administrative officials from all
levels of government.9 For those practitioners and professional researchers, the new Society
represented a forum where those wishing to share in the development of a “science” of public
administration could meet regardless of their applied specialties in budgeting or personnel
management or public works engineering. Among the academics were a number who believed it
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was time (in Dwight Waldo's phrase) to “loosen public administration from the restraints of
political science…” (quoted in Henry, 1987, pp. 44). But the prominent role of non-academics
indicates that the founding of ASPA was not focused on creating or legitimizing a distinct social
science discipline. A higher priority was given to forging “closer links between the academy and
the public authorities who were the primary consumers of the academy's research and training
activities” (Egger, 1975, p. 74).10
Another organizational manifestation of a field’s striving for consensus – or at least an indicator
of its success or failure in this regard – is the creation of autonomous academic units devoted to
the subject. With rare exceptions, psychology, political science, economics and other social
science fields became common components of academic structures in most higher education
institutions by the 1930s. Here as well, Public Administration’s early development provides
mixed signals about the strength of the emerging consensus. A handful of autonomous academic
units devoted to the field existed in the early 1930s, although there were about three dozen or
more degree programs and training curricula offered by political science and engineering
faculties, and even by some research institutes and bureaus. By the 1970s there were over a
hundred programs identifying themselves with the field of Public Administration, with about 50
reporting some distinct identity within their institutions, and 20 of those existing as truly
autonomous academic units (Stone & Stone, 1975). Today [1999] there are at least 245 academic
units belonging to the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, and
perhaps several dozen more that would consider themselves associated with the field of Public
Administration (see NASPAA, 1999). Despite this growth, however, the mixed organizational
formats and ambivalent status of these academic units within their institutions reflects lingering
questions both within and outside the field about the strength of its identity – and thus mirrors
field’s relatively weak consensus.
The test of any field’s consensus, however, comes in the form of inevitable challenges and
controversies generated from within. Within academe, no disciplinary consensus – weak or
strong – goes unchallenged for long. Not only are there inevitable disagreements over
competing theories or alternative methods;11 there are also those who invariably seek even
greater consensus than already exists by advocating “grand theories,” or “theories of everything”
(e.g., see Barrow, 1991). Such challenges emerge in every field, whether we are discussing highlevel theoretical physics or Public Administration.12 What differentiates the fields is their
respective capacity to build on or use the existing consensus to meet the challenges. In those
fields where the fundamental consensus is strong (i.e., modern physics and other basic sciences),
the controversies are handled through “normal science” routines. In less consensual contexts,
controversies take the form of challenges to some dominant view within the field, with the result
that the discipline begins to resemble a conglomeration of distinct but powerful sub disciplines
(e.g., psychology) or a very active political arena where differences are tolerated and debated,
and compromises struck among the field’s elite (e.g., political science) (Lowi, 1972).
For Public Administration, an early intellectual consensus built around what we now often call
the “classical” approach (i.e., scientific management and the “principles of administration”)
dominated until the end of World War Two. By then the emerging Canon included the writings
of Luther Gulick and the advocates of the “principles” orthodoxy as well as the growing body of
work associated with government reform and reorganization. The postwar attack on that
consensus would seriously undermine the foundations of that Canon – converting most of it into
an “anti-Canon” that stood for decades as textbook examples of outmoded and oversimplified
perspectives. The major thrusts of the postwar criticisms came from two directions, one
(represented in the work of Herbert Simon) challenging the integrity of the field’s claim to
science and another (led by Dwight Waldo) exposing its weak normative underpinnings. These
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two challenges proved equally effective in undermining the orthodox consensus; more
importantly, they came at a time when the field was unable to contend with the consequences by
forging a new consensus. Instead, what took center stage was a debate between those seeking to
create a social science focused on administration (Simon’s agenda) and those committed to a
normative agenda for the field (Waldo’s goal). I will discuss that debate in greater detail below,
for in a sense it shaped the minimal consensus that did emerge in the form of agreement that
the field needed to find some focus to fill the void left by the devastation of orthodoxy.13
By the early 1960s, the debate had become unjoined as the major advocates for a social science
of Public Administration abandoned the field to seek identity elsewhere, some in other parts of
political science (e.g. comparative political studies14), others in the emerging fields of
administrative and organizational studies.15 No hoped-for “reformulation” or “new orthodoxy”
emerged, and those remaining in the field began to accept (albeit reluctantly) a non-disciplinary
identity (see discussion of the “professional stance” below). By providing a conceptual focus in
the form of “paradigms,” Thomas S. Kuhn’s (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
revitalized discussions about the need for consensus within the field, and the search for some
form of intellectual consensus has been an ongoing project central to numerous discussions and
critiques of the field ever since (e.g., Golembiewski, 1977; Henry, 1987; see also Martin, 1989).
Given the current state of Public Administration, is a new or more comprehensive consensus
necessary to sustain the field? Probably not, and for some critics the preoccupation with
developing such a consensus has proven too costly (Golembiewski, 1977). Nevertheless, the
striving for consensus of some sort will continue because there are some practical as well as
psychic advantages gained as a result of reaching consensus in a field. Studies of graduate
faculties in the sciences and social sciences indicate that scholars in fields characterized by
relatively high intellectual consensus stand at the top of the academic social system and create
clearer patterns for career advancement and the attainment of status within a field. These highconsensus fields also receive more favorable treatment from funding sources, and are more
likely to provide opportunities for research of even the most abstract problems.
Among those fields with which Public Administration has been historically and intellectually
linked, their status as social “sciences” has had mixed blessings. Relative to the “hard” or
“natural” sciences, they often find themselves subject to the academic equivalent of snobbery
and abuse applied to those of lower social status.16 On the other hand, the “mainstream” social
sciences seem prone to treating their “professional” siblings (e.g., social work and education, as
well as Public Administration) with equal disdain or indifference. For Public Administration,
the decision of the 1967 program committee for the American Political Science Association
annual meeting not to include a section related to the field has long symbolized its psychic
alienation from other social sciences.17 Within institutions, similar challenges take the form of
controversies surrounding the allocation of resources or personnel decisions.
The unrelenting urge toward greater consensus within Public Administration has been
increasingly evident since the 1980s. The field’s major journals are publishing more articles
focused on the quality of Public Administration theory and research (see White & Adams,
1994a), and every major Public Administration conference seems to have a number of panels or
events addressing “identity crisis” issues. The issue addressed in this paper is the failure of the
leading theorists in the field to satisfy what seems to be a collective desire.
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The Professional Stance
The other major “risky” premise of this essay is the assumed desirability of establishing Public
Administration's identity as a social science discipline. Such an assumption, of course, implies
that the field currently defines itself otherwise, and/or that there are alternatives to the social
science stance. In that regard, I take seriously the conventional wisdom that the field has
adopted (and adapted to) an identity closer to that of a profession than to a social science
discipline. Furthermore, I also consider identification with the humanities as a serious option.
Public Administration’s situation differs from similar identity crises that seem to constantly
reemerge over time in fields such as political science, anthropology, history, and economics. For
those other fields, past and present discussions about the nature of their disciplinary identity
have occurred (and recurred – see Wylie, 1996) within the context of the “two cultures” debate
eloquently articulated by C.P. Snow in his 1959 lectures on the growing intellectual gap between
the sciences and the humanities (Snow, 1959). More often than not, it is a debate between
advocates of social science methodologies and those favoring approaches that would associate
them more closely with the humanities.18
For Public Administration, however, a serious third option emerged early in the field’s history.
At its simplest, the debate centers on the issue of whether the practice of public administration
itself was an art, a science, or a craft. Taking their cues from either the “art” or “science”
positions alone, the debates over the field’s identity might have followed the same pattern as the
related disciplines. But the idea of public-administration-as-craft opened a third path toward a
“professional” stance.
Perhaps the classic statements of Public Administration’s contemporary identity problem are
found in two 1968 essays by Dwight Waldo in which he reflects on the state of the field (Waldo,
1968a, 1968b). Waldo directly (and with characteristic honesty) confronts the issue of how the
community of “self-aware” Public Administration scholars should define their mutual endeavor.
At the outset of his discussion, Waldo rejects two traditional alternative solutions: subdisciplinary status within political science19 (or, for that matter, within any other discipline),
and status as a distinct discipline among the social sciences (which he regarded as both too
ambitious and not ambitious enough).20 Instead, Waldo advocates the now famous solution that
“we try to act as a profession without actually being one, and perhaps without the hope or
intention of becoming one in any strict sense” (Waldo, 1968b, p. 10). Acknowledging that this
position would be subject to “ridicule,” Waldo nevertheless defended the professionalism
option:
The professional perspective or stance is the only one broad and flexible
enough to enable us to contain our diverse interests and objectives, yet
firm and understandable enough to provide some unity and sense of
direction and purpose. It has meaning and contains useful cues and
imperatives both in the academic world in which public administration is
studied and taught and in the governmental world in which public
administration is practiced. In the larger environment in which both
these related enterprises are carried on, it gives us more purchase than
any other oriented idea (Waldo, 1968b, p. 10).
As an analogy, Waldo (1968b) uses the field of medicine where “science and art, theory and
practice, study and application” are included under the umbrella of a profession. “It is not based
on a single discipline, but utilizes many. It is not united by a single theory, and is justified and
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given direction by a broad social purpose” (p. 10). (In other contexts, Waldo would use the
metaphor of “enterprise” to characterize the field’s broad scope and diverse perspectives
[Waldo, 1980]. But it was the professional stance that he regarded as more strategically viable.)
The need to incorporate all aspects of the field in resolving the identity crisis is an important
and defining characteristic of Waldo's support of the professional approach, especially for its
impact on the academic field of Public Administration. One of the major objectives of Waldo
and others has been to maintain the inclusive nature of the more general community we call
public administration. This effort has deep roots in the brief intellectual history of governmental
studies in the United States. When formed in 1903, the American Political Science Association
adopted three missions which seemed so complementary at the time that they were regarded as
ideally and necessarily indistinguishable: enhancing the civic education of the public, training
public servants, and conducting research on government and politics.21 The centrality of Public
Administration in political science through the 1930s and 1940s is evident in almost all aspects
of the discipline – including the commitment to maintain a close working relationship between
scholars and practitioners.
In hindsight, however, the signs of change can be found throughout the 1930s, and perhaps
nowhere more clearly than in the formation of the American Society for Public Administration
as a distinct entity. While it would be an oversimplification, one can characterize the history as a
growing split between those in political science who sought to legitimize the discipline’s claim to
status as a social science, and those committed to maintaining the link between research and
practice in governmental affairs. To the increasingly influential hardline social scientists
desiring greater detachment and objectivity for their discipline, their contact and efforts on
behalf of practitioners intellectually tainted Public Administrationists; in contrast, practitioners
often regarded them as too scholarly and academic. As a result, the contemporary student of
Public Administration assumed “an ambiguous and often uncomfortable dual second-class
citizenship status: He is the academic’s practical man and the public administrator’s academic”
(Waldo, 1968a, p. 444-445).
It was within the context of that commitment that Waldo's argument for professional standing
made sense. Public Administration involved not merely the study of government operations and
management; it inherently included a “broad social purpose” no different from that
characterizing the study of medicine. Any effort to resolve the identity crisis must encompass
that strong commitment to purpose.
Public administration in contemporary government is not less,
but more, complex than caring for and curing the ill (which, in a
formal sense, it often embraces). We need a perspective, an
orientation, appropriate to the task. In terms of my assigned
topic, the scope of our theory should extend as far as the
professional challenge and should respond to the needs and
opportunities it presents. If the analogy to medicine has any
validity, this means that we must be concerned not with a theory
but with theories, indeed, with theories of many types, many
dimensions and facets. The professional stand does not by a
simple point-in-the-slot procedure provide “answers,” nor does it
even provide a complete and clear agenda of theoretical problems.
It does provide a framework large enough to embrace our
theoretical problems; it helps to clarify the problems posed and to
define the nature of proper answers; it gives direction on the time
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that which and the level at which to seek solutions. Above all, it
gives unity while permitting diversity. (Waldo, 1968b, p. 10-11)
Although published in 1968, and despite criticisms of his stand, Waldo's remarks should be read
as authoritative rather than suggestive. He was articulating a position that had in fact come to
wide acceptance during the postwar years in lieu of any strong consensus that might have led to
a more disciplinary stance. As I argue below, Waldo wrote from the position of victor in his
debate with Simon over the direction of the field. But from the perspective of 1968, the victory
seemed a somewhat hollow one. At a time when he served as unofficial spokesman for the field
from his formal positions as editor of Public Administration Review and the Albert Schweitzer
Professor
of
Humanities
at
the
Maxwell
School,
Waldo
presented
the
“professionalism” stance without enthusiasm and with the rationale that it provided as good a
strategy for dealing with the identity crisis as any other alternative.
However, such a solution proved only partially satisfying. His belief that by acting like a
profession, the field might actually become one, has borne some fruit within academe in the
form of a growing number of professional schools and formalized accreditation. Public
Administration is rarely perceived as a distinct social science in academe. In line with Waldo's
perspective discussed above, it is more frequently regarded as a field for professional education.
In this regard, Public Administration educators have been successful (more often than not) in
their efforts to extricate themselves both institutionally and intellectually from traditional
political science departments22 while maintaining some distance from the clutches of other
“social science” professions (e.g., social welfare, management).23
Yet the attraction of disciplinary status remains powerful among members of the Public
Administration community of scholars. It is a status that academic fields strive for as self-aware
collectivities, and it has eluded our field for decades.
Disciplinary status in academe requires more than a collective declaration by members of the
field.24 There are some characteristics common to fields that achieve disciplinary status, most
related to the development of consensus discussed above. Each field takes on a separate identity
from other fields, and each is able to point to the establishment of distinct units in academic
institutions. Members of the field become increasingly professionalized – that is, they achieve
their membership by acquiring a body of knowledge that eventually takes the form of
credentials. These characteristics apply whether we are discussing the humanities, the natural
sciences, or the social sciences. In the case of the natural and social sciences, an additional
commitment to “scientific logic” (Waldo terms this “scientism”25) is also regarded as
fundamental, although the exact meaning of that concept varies by time and field (see Ross,
1979).
As important, however, is the capacity of the field’s members to interact with scholars from
related disciplines on a relatively equal footing. Although seeking recognition as a separate and
distinct group, the creation of a discipline requires interaction with other fields.26 Interestingly,
Waldo himself provides us with a case study of what is required for disciplinary status in his
historical overview of political science published in 1975 (Waldo, 1975). Political science and
other mainstream social sciences did not emerge in a vacuum, but rather as part of a growing
movement in the post-Civil War era to apply the logic of scientific rationality to modern
problems. The field itself was shaped into a discipline through a dialectical process involving
contrasting efforts to enhance specialized knowledge while engaging in relationships and
exchanges with related fields that highlighted overlaps and similarities. Political science
achieved its status as a social science through its interactions with other social sciences, and by
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accepting the emerging standards of scholarship that it helped create through its relationships
with the greater community of social science scholars.
As I indicate below, despite Waldo’s disparaging comments about the desirability of disciplinary
status for Public Administration, the possibility of moving from the professional stance toward a
disciplinary identity has been constant theme in the field’s identity crisis. The urge for
disciplinary status is (perhaps paradoxically) inherent in the scholarly and instructional roles
played by Public Administrationists under the professional stance. While committed to
advancing the professionalism of practitioners through education and research, those who teach
public administrators and publish in the field are also part of the academic culture where
mainstream disciplinary norms dominate, and where professional schools are often isolated
from the more traditional faculties. Try as they might to maintain a distinction between
themselves and their colleagues in the humanities and social sciences, they are pulled toward
disciplinary status and its psychic (if not practical) benefits.
In a 1987 paper addressing the “disappointment and ridicule” suffered by Public
Administrationists, Kenneth J. Meier and Joseph Stewart, Jr., summarize the benefits of
disciplinary identity:
Disciplines are admittedly artificial divisions of knowledge, but
they are useful for precisely the same reason that any divisions of
labor or classification schemes are useful. They help us organize.
They give the field of study coherence and often define a research
agenda. As students of public administration have found political
science too limiting, they have borrowed theories, methods, and
analytic approaches from organizational sociology and
psychology, management, law, history, and economics. But
lacking any consensus on what constitutes the core of the field and
what its appropriate research agenda is, public administration
fails to integrate or take as its own what it discovers in other
disciplines. Public administration borrows, but it does not adopt,
foster, or develop. It does not incorporate because there is no
clearly defined torso to attach appendages. Public administration
remains a multidisciplinary, rather than an interdisciplinary,
field. (Meier & Stewart, 1987, p. 6)
Rather than focusing on whether it ought to be disciplinary, the issue for Public
Administrationists should be selecting status within either the social science or humanities
disciplines. Historically, the roots of Public Administration in political science tend to draw
them closer to the social sciences. There are, however, growing pressures to direct the field
toward the humanities by stressing the benefits of knowledge drawn from interpretive and
literary methods (see Kass & Catron, 1990). In this essay, I follow a preference for the social
sciences.
What does it mean to suggest that Public Administration – or for that matter, the study of any
human endeavor – can be a “social science”? What constitutes a “social science” today? For
those engaged in what I have been referring to as “mainstream” social science, the standard is
that is at once superficially minimal and in reality quite complex. For many it is engaging in
“scientific research” about social life, and thus being “scientific” (whatever that means) is
regarded as the defining characteristic of the social science. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994)
recently noted four features of relevant research: (1) it is “designed to make descriptive or
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explanatory inferences on the basis of empirical information…”; (2) it uses “explicit, codified,
and public methods to generate and analyze data whose reliability can therefore be assessed”; (3)
it accepts the role of “uncertainty” in the conduct of research; and (4) it “adheres to a set of rules
of inference on which its validity depends” (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p.7-9).
It is not the purpose of this paper to pass judgment on these or any other criteria for defining
what is or is not social science research. It is enough to note that mainstream social scientists
perceive themselves as members of a broad “truth community” (a variant on the “imagined
communities” concept) through which certain knowledge development approaches are
legitimized and others challenged. Achieving status as a field within such a community requires
more than having individual members engage in legitimized activities. It requires a field-wide
consensus that the norms and standards of the broader truth community should become the
principal force in shaping knowledge development and theory building among its members.27
The building of such consensus should be the job of those agenda setters and gatekeepers that I
am labeling theorists.
The Argument in Brief
In the section that follows, I set the stage for my argument by focusing on a key event in the
intellectual history of Public Administration – the publication of Simon’s Administrative
Behavior in 1947. The importance of that work goes beyond the content of the arguments made
by Simon. As important was the challenge it posed for students in the field to make the
sacrifices (e.g., objectivity, detachment) required of scholars in a field assuming its status as a
social science – at least, as defined in the heyday of logical positivist influence. I offer an
overview of how that challenge played itself out in intellectual disputes between Simon and
Waldo. In the end, both sides would win. A social science would emerge from Simon’s work (i.e.,
the administrative sciences) and he would go on to pre-eminence as a Nobel laureate whose
approach to theory transformed entire disciplines outside his own (see Davis, 1996; Fry, 1986).
At the same time, Waldo would win over the minds – and hearts – of Public Administrationists
and help define the status of the field for most of the post-World War II period.
I follow this with a critical assessment of the current state of Public Administration theory,
focusing on several recent and highly acclaimed works. The intent here is not to critique
individual theories, but to indicate the challenge now facing the Public Administration
community if it would seek (as I think it should) to reclaim its promising status as a social
science discipline. I argue that today's theorists are still engaged in the effort to protect the field
from the logical positivist agenda – despite the fact that logical positivism has long since lost its
influence in the social science disciplines.
Finally, I consider some developments in the “post-modern” social sciences that bode well for
Public Administration’s efforts to assume disciplinary status. I will argue from a position of
optimism based on changes in mainstream methodological perspectives that have moved away
from the logical positivist foundations of the past and in the direction of approaches that the
more reasonable critics within Public Administration will find acceptable. I also stress, however,
that the move toward disciplinary status will not be easy, and may ultimately fail unless the
field’s intellectual leaders support a pro-disciplinary consensus.
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Challenge and Reaction
Simon’s Challenge
Public Administration’s status among the social sciences was not always as unclear as it is today.
In 192628 the Social Science Research Council established an Advisory Committee on Public
Administration with the intention of “upgrading academic research in the field and bringing it
into closer and more operational contact with innovations in administrative methods and
procedures” (Egger, 1975, p. 66). By 1936, the Committee’s funding activity accounted for onefifth of the SSRC’s expenditures, including support for special studies, commissions, research
institutes, and creation of academic units devoted to the field.29 These and related
developments led Dean Mosher of Syracuse University’s Maxwell School to declare in 1939 that
the field “is itself a discipline and a method that is learnable and teachable” (Egger, 1975, p. 65).
The Second World War intervened, however, and all disciplinary development came to a halt as
many Public Administrationists left academe for assignments in the war effort. What they
learned during the war significantly altered their views, creating a postwar cadre of “realists”
ready to question their prewar assumptions. James W. Fesler (1975) notes at least four major
“shifts” in the field’s postwar agenda:
(1) the shift from administrative specialties (e.g., personnel,
purchasing, and workflow planning) to the line operations
concerned with achieving public purposes; (2) a shift from the
chief executive and major auxiliary-and-control agencies to
administrative problems of the departmental and bureau levels;
(3) a shift from general, abstract principles to appreciation of the
varying contexts of individual departments and programs; and (4)
a shift from the rather arid concerned for efficiency and economy
to a concerned for how American public administration is (or
should be) affected by the political values and processes of its
democratic setting. (Fesler, 1975, p. 104-105)
In this context, both the emerging prewar orthodoxy and disciplinary pretensions came under
scrutiny by a group of young scholars emboldened by their wartime experience. The first explicit
challenge came with Simon's (1946) famous “Proverbs of Administration” article pointing to
fundamental flaws in the principles approach. Several months later, Public Administration
Review published an article by Robert A. Dahl highlighting the major obstacles facing any effort
to establish a science of administration based on general principles (Dahl, 1947). Waldo’s work
would follow a year later. The foundations of the field’s prewar consensus were being effectively
undercut. Could Public Administration’s disciplinary status be salvaged from the resulting
ruins?
In a very direct sense, that question was central to the debate between Simon and Waldo that
dominated the field for the next decade. In hindsight, it was the publication of Simon’s
Administrative Behavior that triggered the debate, although there is no evidence of an
immediate reaction (see Simon’s comments in later editions). Published in 1947, that work was
not merely the product of wartime experience. It began as Simon’s dissertation before the war,
and to some extent reflects intellectual developments in the field tracing back to at least the
mid-1930s30 as some scholars began to raise issues about the quality of research in the field.
Like Public Administrationists educated at the University of Chicago and influenced by Charles
Merriam and other leading advocates of an empirical political science, Simon sought to rescue
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the field from what he and others perceived to be the pseudo-scientific approaches of Taylorism,
the human relations movement, and the “principles of administration” (Martin, 1952).31 The
basis of the critique was not “anti-scientific”; quite the opposite, Simon sought to save Public
Administration from “bad science.” Thus, while challenging the integrity of the “science of
administration” that dominated in the prewar years, Simon was simultaneously proposing a
more credible social science approach for the field.32
An important feature of Simon’s social science perspective was its roots in the logical positivist
approach popular among many young scholars at the time, especially at Chicago. In addition to
his exposure to the rich and diverse perspective on empirical research provided by the political
science and sociology faculty at the university, Simon attended courses on logic taught by
Rudolf Carnap, arguably by then the most visible member of the famed Vienna Circle. In his
autobiography, Simon implies that his dissertation – which eventually developed into
Administrative Behavior – had its roots in the philosophy of social science he culls from
Carnap’s teachings (Simon, 1991). Carnap offered a clear vision of what constitutes a “science”:
the presentation of knowledge in empirically verifiable statements untainted by the bias of
values or ethical statements (see Smith, 1997; Wilson, 1998). It is a position Simon (1957)
adopts in his brief but vigorous discussion of what constitutes a “science” in the final chapter of
Administrative Behavior: “science is interested in sentences only with regard to their
verification” (p. 248-249).33
It would be a mistake, however, to regard Simon’s attachment to logical positivism as
unthinking, or untempered. He was, if anything, a critical adherent to the approach.34 In
addition, there were the offsetting influences of Merriam's Chicago School.35 While stressing the
need to apply scientific methods to the study of politics and government, the behaviorists at
Chicago were also progressives and New Dealers committed to political change. As Simon would
note in 1993, the Chicago behaviorists “generally believed that understanding must precede
advocacy, and that to a limited extent [they] were able to separate their roles as scientists from
their roles as citizens, a separation that is still eminently desirable if clear thought is to prevail in
the discipline” (Simon, 1993, p. 49).
For Simon, adopting a logical positivist method did not require a complete and total
indifference to the social dimensions of political or administrative life. Responding to Theodore
Lowi’s critical assessment of Chicago School behaviorism (Lowi, 1992), Simon notes that “the
individual decision maker is never taken as an uncaused-cause, independent of society” – a
point, he stresses, that is repeatedly emphasized in Administrative Behavior. Nor did it require
that the scientist engage in over-generalization or be permitted to claim more for his or her
theory that is warranted. Nevertheless, the approach generates significant insights through the
theories they generate.
Theorists of decision-making don't understand the whole polity…;
but they have taught us an enormous amount about the minds
(and emotions) of the human characters who play roles in the
political drama... They have told us much about how these actors
think, what they know, and what they value. Without that
knowledge, accounts of events at the global, holistic level become
pointless (if hair-raising) dramas without plot or motive.
No one argues that all political studies should take decisionmaking as their organizing thread. But for all that, it has been an
extremely effective organizer, shaping much of the most useful
work in the discipline. And for larger systems (e.g., in studying
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public administration), the underlying structure of decisionmaking processes illuminates the coherence of the whole, the
contributions of the parts to that whole, the organization’s
functions and its malfunctions. (Simon, 1993, p. 50)
Simon was also influenced by at least two efforts to apply social scientific methods to the study
of public administration published prior to World War Two. In an opening footnote, Simon
makes reference to the authors of those works: Chester I. Barnard and Edwin O. Stene.
Barnard’s influence on Simon is quite explicit (Simon, 1957),36 and concepts drawn from
Barnard’s (1968) The Functions of the Executive are frequently cited in Administrative
Behavior.37 In his famous Harvard lectures, Barnard stressed the need for a “science of
organization or of coöperative systems” that would complement and enhance the “power” of the
“executive arts” (Barnard, 1968, p. 290-291). While acknowledging that his particular
“hypothetical scheme” was primarily based on “many years of practical work with organizations
of various kinds,” Barnard hoped it would stimulate work among social scientists (Barnard,
1968, p. 292-293). Simon eagerly took on the challenge.38
Less prominently mentioned – although perhaps no less important – was Stene’s 1940 article in
American Political Science Review. In that work, Stene expressly addressed the need for theory
in the study of public administration. He noted the growing body of empirical studies related to
public sector administration, but questioned whether the field would advance without the
development of a “rational theory” to guide those efforts.
Political scientists who give advice regarding fields and methods
of possible research seemed to emphasize the need for empirical
study. There is a danger, however, that the empirical studies will
be a lacking in direction or meaning until they are capable of
being interpreted in full light of propositions brought forth by the
rational or theoretical approach. Pithecanthropus was not
discovered until after Darwin had expounded his theory of
evolution, and the discovery probably would have had little
significance prior to that time. Principles of economics which
were originally derived from relatively superficial observations
has served as guides to extensive empirical studies in recent years,
but thus far the major conclusions derived from the rational
analyses have been changed very little.
Without disparaging the importance of empirical research,
therefore, one may be justified in taking the view that the early
development of a rational theory is indispensable to the
advancement of scientific method in the study of administration.
(Stene, 1940, p. 1126)
Given its ultimate influence in a wide range of disciplines, there is little need to review the
substance of Simon’s Administrative Behavior, other than to stress the role intended for his
theory as a foundation for Public Administration in the form of the “administrative sciences.”
He draws an important distinction between a “theoretical” and “practical” social science, noting
that the theory-building goal of the scientist demands that he or she focus on the elaboration and
confirmation of factual statements. However, in the case of the administrative sciences, the
resulting theory is intended for practical application in addition to its value as a body of
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knowledge. At the very end of his famous work, Simon expresses his hopes in the form of an
analogy with economics:
These two alternative forms of administrative science [theoretical
and practical] are exactly analogous to the two forms which
economics science takes. First, economic theory and institutional
economics are generalized descriptions of the behavior of men in
the market. Second, business theory states those conditions of
business behavior which will result in the maximization of profit.
(Simon, 1957, p. 253)
This was ground-breaking material, and yet when first published, Administrative Behavior
“created no sensation..., but it was widely and quite favorably reviewed in journals of public
administration and business management.” At the time, Simon notes, “I was disappointed that
none of the reviewer's recognized it as the revolutionary document I firmly believed it to be…”
(Simon, 1957, p. 88).39
The Response
While generating no immediate reaction, Simon’s work would eventually prove to be as
revolutionary as he perceived and hoped – enough so as to earn him the Nobel Prize for
transforming the way economists and others perceived rational behavior. But in his own field of
Public Administration, Simon’s efforts generated mostly critical reactions that stirred debate,
and eventually moved the field in the direction of the professional stance and research standards
more closely aligned with the humanities than the social sciences.
Dwight Waldo’s The Administrative State was being released at the same time that Simon was
still reading the reviews of Administrative Behavior. If Simon represented the “hard” side of the
social sciences, Waldo represented the “softer” approaches – a point he makes in retrospective
comments published with the 1984 edition of his classic work.40 While in agreement with Simon
on the shortcomings of scientific management and the “principles” approaches, Waldo was
more skeptical of efforts to rely solely on logical positivist methods in development of a theory
for Public Administration. His perspective on the sciences developed under different
assumptions about the possibility of separating out “facts” for scientific study.
Waldo’s views on the philosophy of science were shaped during his graduate student years at
Yale University.
That F. S. C. Northrop was at Yale during my graduate study I
regard as a stroke of good luck. His interpretations of science,
which I largely followed, I judge to have held up well in the
following decades in which scientific philosophy and methodology
became something of an academic growth industry. The
limitations on physical science methods with regard to human
affairs that, following Northrop, I then judged valid I still judge
valid... (Waldo, 1984, p. xlin)
Northrop's views on scientific method and the role of theory were neither anti-scientific nor
anti-theory (Chaudhuri, 1967).41 Rather, they were critical of (a) the popular conception of an
atheoretical science dealing with “facts” alone,42 and (b) the view among some social scientists
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that it was possible to apply the empirical methods of physical science to human affairs without
taking into account the cultural and social context of the observed phenomena.43
On the first point, Waldo notes that the popular misconception of the scientific method being a
purely “factual” endeavor had carried over to the study of public administration, and that the
“scientific inadequacy of the factual approach in public administration is now patent” (Waldo,
1984, p. 171). Revisiting this issue years later, Waldo noted the dilemma posed for those who
assumed the scientific focus on facts.
The split between fact and value, ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ creates problems
for the social scientist. It makes for a split personality. On the one
hand the social scientist, as a general rule, carries along the
baggage of moral beliefs he has received from the past, the beliefs
constituting the liberal democratic outlook. On the other hand,
the original philosophical foundations for these beliefs have
disappeared, and no philosophy has gained general acceptance as
a suitable alternative. So the social scientist lives in two worlds
lacking an organic connection. There is the world of the facts, with
which he is concerned as a scientist. And there is the world of his
ideology or values. Since his value system cannot be justified in
terms of facts, and his professional dedication is thought of as one
to Fact, he is without justification for carrying his value system
into his science. (Waldo, 1955, p. 62)
Waldo notes that this dilemma is merely a “pseudo problem” for those adhering to a logical
positivist view. Questions related to values cannot and should not be considered by the social
scientist, for they involve statements that cannot be empirically verified. Values entered into
the equation when the theoretical knowledge accumulated by empirical studies are to be applied,
and in that context of science is indifferent if not irrelevant (Waldo, 1955). Given Simon's views
expressed in Administrative Behavior, this is a fair summation.
Waldo challenges these assertions on several grounds. He notes that the distinction between fact
and value is more logical than real. In addition, there is the danger that what is intended as
merely an “instrument of analysis” will become “inevitably a program of action – with
unfortunate results.” Finally, and more specific to the concerns of Public Administration, the
fact/value distinction promotes the separation of means from ends – “which is what
administration is about.”
It is on the last point that Waldo would eventually build his critique of Simon's efforts to
establish a theory of administrative behavior, but his comments in The Administrative State
were focused on Stene’s efforts to formulate a theory of administrative statics. 44 Waldo was
most critical of Stene’s effort to develop a generic theory, free from the normative context and
other situational specifics that characterize the work of public organizations. “Administrative
study, no less than economics study, is at its heart normative. Determinism does not apply to
free will; ‘conservation laws’ do not apply to purposive human beings” (Waldo, 1984, p. 176).
With values so prominent in the work of government, Waldo believed that Public
Administration must give priority to carefully and critically examining normative theories
rather than generating the kind of empirical theories advocated by logical positivist approaches.
Following Northrop’s (1949, 1955) views, Waldo focused on the need to study the
“presuppositions” and norms that were at the heart of the American administrative culture – the
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central task and accomplishment of The Administrative State. And like Northrop, Waldo (1952)
believed a theory of “good” (i.e., “democratic”) administration would eventually emerge from
these efforts.
The Debate45
It is perhaps too easy to characterize the intellectual milieu of the period as simply a debate
between two individuals trained in opposing philosophies of science (Carnap’s logical positivism
vs. Northrop's philosophy of cultural), two schools of thought (empiricism vs. normative
theory), or using more recent terminology, two conflicting social science paradigms. The
situation was far more complex.46 Logical positivism had already faced significant challenges
that had undermined its legitimacy both prescriptively (e.g., Werkmeister, 1937a, 1937b) and
descriptively (see Polanyi, 1964). In addition, the growing influence of alternative
methodologies for the social sciences was significant enough to warrant critical assessment by
Nagel, Hempel, and other prominent advocates of naturalistic methods (see Schutz 1954).
Nevertheless, the intellectual confrontation between Waldo and Simon did much to shape and
determined the current status of Public Administration as a field still in the throes of an identity
crisis. Interestingly, the debate itself was rarely manifest in exchanges between the two central
protagonists. One notable exception was Simon's reaction to a comment made by Waldo in his
1952 article in American Political Science Review on the “Development of Theory of Democratic
Administration.” Reasserting a position initially expressed in The Administrative State, Waldo
argued that one
major obstacle in the way of further development of democratic
theory is the idea that efficiency is a value-neutral concept or, still
worse, that it is antithetical to democracy. To hold that we should
take efficiency as the central concept of our “science” but that we
nevertheless must tolerate a certain amount of democracy
because we “believe” in it, is to poison the taproot of American
society. To maintain that efficiency is value-neutral and to
propose at the same time that it be used as the central concept in a
“science” of administration is to commit one's self to nihilism, so
long as the prescription is actually followed. (Waldo, 1952, p. 97)
In an accompanying footnote, Waldo explicitly attacks the assertion that decisions can be
analyzed without reference to values. He ends that note with the comment that “Herbert Simon
has patently made outstanding contributions to administrative study. These contributions have
been made, however, when he has worked free of the methodology he has asserted” (Waldo,
1952, p. 97).
Simon's response came in the next issue of the American Political Science Review. He
acknowledges Waldo's compliments, but felt “impelled” to comment “because the faults of
Waldo's analysis are characteristic of the writings of those who call themselves ‘political
theorists’ and who are ever ready to raise the battle cry against positivism and empiricism. A
scientist is not (and, in my system of personal values, should not be) flattered by being told that
his conclusions are good, but do not follow from his premises. If Mr. Waldo's [comment] is
correct, then I should be condemned, not flattered” (Simon, Drucker, & Waldo, 1952, p. 494).
He follows this with a critical commentary on the quality of Waldo’s arguments:
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The study of logic and empirical science has impressed on me the
extreme care that must be exercised, in the search for truth, to
avoid logical booby traps. For this reason the kind of prose I
encounter in writings on political theory, decorated with
assertion, invective, and metaphor, sometimes strikes me as
esthetically pleasing, but seldom as convincing. Since I am unable
to discover definitions in Mr. Waldo's paper for his key terms,
since he does not set forth his basic premises in any systematic
fashion, and since his propositions appear to skip from
philosophy to psychology to history and back, I have not
succeeded in reconstructing the syllogisms which I presumed he
reached his conclusions. (Simon, Drucker, & Waldo, 1952, p. 494)
Generalizing from that criticism, Simon states that he does not "see how we can progress in
political philosophy if we continue to think and write in the loose, literary, metaphorical style
that he and most other theorists adopt. The standard of unrigor [sic] that is tolerated in political
theory would not receive a passing grade in the elementary course in logic, Aristotelian or
symbolic.
If political philosophers wish to preserve democracy from what
they regard as the termitic borings of positivism, I suggest that as
the first step they acquire a sufficient technical skill in modern
logical analysis to attack the positivists on their own ground. Most
of the positivists and empiricists of my acquaintance will then be
likely to receive them more as allies in the search for truth then as
enemies. (Simon, Drucker, & Waldo, 1952, p. 496)
The debate continued throughout the 1950s, although with less directness and in a somewhat
softer tone.47 Waldo (1955) continued to take issue with the logical positivist perspective on
values, while Simon (1957) continued to characterize his critics as “political theorists” (rather
than giving them the status of Public Administrationists) whose criticisms were faulty and
lacking rigor. A process of mellowing also began during this period, with both Simon and Waldo
expressing reluctance to stand by every word and paragraph written about positions contrary to
their own. In 1984, Waldo states he
must confess… that at the time [1940s] I was not well informed
about this significant development [i.e., logical positivism]; and
while my treatment of positivism as a temper and characteristic
of modern philosophy will pass muster (I believe), my discussion
would have been improved by more awareness of the philosophic
movement that would prove to be so significant for developments
not only in philosophy but for the social sciences, and for public
administration specifically, chiefly through its formal
introduction in… Administrative Behavior. (Waldo, 1984, p.
xxxix)
As for Simon, the irony of receiving ASPA’s 1995 Dwight Waldo Award for his outstanding
contributions to the study of Public Administration led him to remark that
There was no real conflict between Dwight's vision and mine,
except that each of us felt a strong urge to direct attention to the
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particular problem area in administrative theory that we felt to be
most urgent, and our priorities were different. Nevertheless, with
the enthusiasm of the young (which I hope neither of us has lost),
we managed to exchange some rather purple prose… which,
however, never interfered with our personal friendship. (Simon,
1995, p. 404)
“As matters worked out over the years,” Simon continued, “public administration absorbed both
revolutions…” (p. 404).
That last observation, however well intended, does not do justice to the current situation. It is
evident that Simon's work has had considerable influence in mainstream Public Administration
research, but more often it has served as a counterpoint to those who have shaped the
intellectual tone of the field. A social science discipline did emerge from Simon's work, but it
was established as a distinct alternative to Public Administration. The administrative sciences –
and its central publication, Administrative Science Quarterly – would initially draw its
“subscribers” from the ranks of Public Administrationists as well as those in related fields (e.g.,
sociology and management). By the 1960s, however, administrative sciences had developed into
the scholarly extension of business administration and organizational studies.
Within the Public Administration community itself, social science scholarship was often
subsumed under the pressures of a field intellectually committed to avoiding the perceived
drawbacks and traps inherent to what had emerged as mainstream social science. In that regard,
Waldo's characterization of Public Administration as a “profession” served two purposes. On the
one hand, it legitimized the distinct position of the field by stressing its working relationships
with practitioners and “real world” problems. On the other hand, it allowed the field’s
intellectual “gatekeepers” to maintain their defensive posture against the unwarranted intrusion
of the (logical positivist and technocratic) barbarians at the gates.
For those who sought to do more than merely train and advise public administrators – including
Waldo – the success of his perspective (manifest in the contrived identification as a profession)
was intellectually unsatisfactory as well as frustrating. This is apparent in almost every
contribution published in the Waldo-sponsored Toward a New Public Administration (the first
Minnowbrook conference) (Marini, 1971). The desire for disciplinary status as an empirical
social science is pervasive, but so is the desire to maintain the normative standards central to
Waldo's approach. Consider, for example, the following comments drawn from two major
contributions to that work:
The major problem of Public Administration as an intellectual
enterprise is this: Contemporary Public Administration exists in a
state of antique or maladapted analytic models and normative
aridity. There is almost no basis for reaching or accepting either
substantive problems or analytical models save politicaladministrative crises or academic fashion. Teaching and research
tend to be based on past problems or instant response to present
“establishment” problem definitions. Both bases have limited
utility in developing administrative vision, political leadership, or
intellectual vitality of lasting quality. The result has been a
deadening of intellectual vigor and a kind of wandering relevance
to students, practitioners, and the future.
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Younger students, men in public affairs at various levels, and
many among us complain that we are not relevant, that the
intellectual stuff of Public Administration has restricted meaning
and limited significance to their experience, that it misses the
drama of social change… that it misses the point! Most of our
efforts do come perilously close to missing the point; they fall
between the stools of searching normative interpretations and
detailed practical solutions to specific problems faced by
administrators. Most are neither normative league nor practically
relevant. (La Porte, 1971, p. 21)
***
The new Public Administration must cope with… weaknesses in
empirical theory and innovate in selected directions. This chapter,
by pointing up limitations in the quality of systematic empirical
theory, represents an exhortation for greater scientific authority
in the pursuit of our tasks. Obvious steps called for in the future
are to better delineate and seek agreement on the nature of the
things we study, to improve the empirical quality and theoretical
adequacy of our work, and to raise the level of systematization of
our explanations of Public Administration phenomena. But the
new Public Administration requires more than these things. We
must add to our emphasis on better science – scientific authority
– a critical second criterion: moral authority. (Kronenberg, 1971,
p. 217)
In 1977, Robert Golembiewski called for his colleagues to turn their attention away from the
search for a “comprehensive paradigm” and toward more essential work. For Golembiewski, the
intellectual time and energy devoted to “maintenance” functions would be better spent on what
he termed “task” functions. What was unique about his argument was its explicit purpose to
have the field “move beyond the present anguish about identity or intellectual crises in public
administration, and to do so in constructive ways that will highlight specific skills and
technologies for both research and application. Only in this way… is progress in public
administration likely to occur” (Golembiewski, 1977, p. 67). Although sometimes cited,
Golembiewski’s prescriptions have gone unheeded among the field’s leading theorists.
In the late 1980s, the authors of the Blacksburg Manifesto – self-described “Minnowbrook I with
institutional grounding” (Wamsley, 1990, p. 20) – maintained the Waldo-inspired aversion to
endorsing a social science disciplinary identity for the field. They blamed Simon and the
positivist/behavioralists movements in political science and organization theory for diverting
Public Administration theory “into an intellectual cul-de-sac” (Wamsley, 1990, p. 42) and
creating “tacit boundaries” (Wamsley, 1990, p. 246) that had taken decades to overcome.
There has been no major advance in public administration theory
per se beyond the writings of Appleby, Waldo, Redford, Long,
Price, Selznick, Sayre, and others. Although some of these
theorists (most consistently, Long) have continued to expand on
themes that should be central to public administration theory,
those themes have not stirred nearly the interest in serious
theory-building efforts that we feel they warrant. They seem never
to have gained the kind of recognition and adherents they enjoyed
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in the late 1930s or 1940s. There are, no doubt, several reasons
for this, but foremost among them has been the suffocating hold
of behavioralism and positivism upon the social sciences in
general. That hold has begun to loosen in the past two decades,
but very slowly. (Wamsley, 1990, p. 19)48
The urge for disciplinary status continues today, and is perhaps even stronger among those who
regard themselves as social science researchers. A series of articles published in Public
Administration Review and other journals beginning in 1984 have reflected both the desire for
greater “rigor” (in mainstream social science terms) and the equally powerful urge to resist such
standards.49
The indicators are numerous: from the decline of academic membership and conference
participation in the American Society for Public Administration, to the reemergence of a strong
organized section on public administration in the American Political Science Association; from
the growing participation of academics in the annual conferences of the Association for Public
Policy Analysis and Management, to increases in the number and status of scholarly journals
devoted to Public Administration research (e.g., Journal of Public Administration, Research
and Theory, Administration and Society, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management).
The growth in the number of Ph.D. programs in the field has also re-generated concerns about
its status as a social science. A clear distinction must be drawn between the professional
education of practitioners and the academic education of scholars if a doctorate in Public
Administration is not to be merely a “black belt in MPA.”50 This position was supported in
earlier years by such preeminent scholars as Wallace Sayre and Leonard D. White,51 and more
recently led one colleague to suggest that the best Public Administration doctoral programs are
located at least 25 miles from the nearest MPA program.52
But fulfilling that urge for disciplinary status has not been easy. It has proven exceedingly
difficult to overcome a half-century of bias against social scientific methods and theories, as is
evident in the views reflected in several recently published works on the theory and nature of
Public Administration.
Theory as Gatekeeping
The Failure
Despite its importance in the field’s current self-awareness, the “bias against social scientific
methods and theories” alluded to above has hardly been unique to Public Administrationists.
Controversies surrounding the application of “scientific” methods to the study of human affairs
can be traced back at least to the work of Auguste Comte (see Smith, 1997), and the first major
articulation (and defense) of a philosophy of scientific social studies is found in J. S. Mill’s
(1965) On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, published in 1843. The debate certainly intensified
with the elaboration of the logical positivist perspective during the 1920s and 1930s,53 a factor
that shaped much of the content of the Simon/Waldo debate.
The debate itself was more than merely a conflict between those favoring and opposing the
scientific study of society. As I argue in the concluding section, the debate has succeeded in
generating changes within mainstream social science that have fundamentally redefined the
disciplinary standards for research and publication. The degree of change has not satisfied many
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of the most adamant critics, nor has the logical positivist ideal been totally abandoned in
psychology, sociology, political science, and the other social sciences. But the basic idea of what
constitutes legitimate social science research has moved in directions quite in line with the
critical perspectives that have dominated Public Administration for the past half-century. Much
of this change can be attributed to the prominent “theorists” who have played the role of
intellectual gatekeepers in their respective fields (i.e., see Gergen, 1994a).
I argue that those who play similar gatekeeping roles in Public Administration – those who I call
the field’s “theorists” – continue to assume a more isolated and defensive posture. The work of
leading theorists in our field – our intellectual agenda-setters – has remained fixed on the need
to protect our scholarship and our students from the shortcomings and evils of logical positivist
social science. In the process, they have perpetuated a fixed and distorted image of social science
research and have been indifferent to the significant changes in disciplinary approaches. In that
sense, Public Administration theory – or, more specifically, the theorists – has failed us.
Two caveats are in order. First, while contending that Public Administration has not achieved
the status of a social science, I am not arguing that there is a lack of social science scholarship
focused on public administration and government bureaucracy. In fact, quite the opposite is
true. There are a significant number of relevant studies generated each year by scholars who
identify with – and often publish in – other fields, from political science to administrative
science to organizational studies to social psychology. The important point is that few of these
scholars identify with the imagined community of Public Administration scholars. As important,
those conducting such research rarely cite or make reference to the mainstream literature in
Public Administration – thus providing another indicator of the relatively low regard for
research in our field among the social science disciplines.
Second, by focusing on some of the field’s leading theorists, I am not arguing that there exists
some conspiratorial intellectual elite consciously controlling what is or is not presented or
published in the field. Rather, I am arguing that there is a pervasive and powerful anti-social
science theme found in the diverse literature of our field – powerful enough to set the standards
and expectations for researchers in the field. My own “gatekeeping” experience in Public
Administration convinced me that the perceived prejudice against positivist social science
research resulted in fewer submissions of those sorts of manuscripts.54 For those who might
challenge the dominant view, it is easier to present and publish one’s work outside the field than
it is to fight the “powers that be.” No less a figure than Herbert A. Simon himself offers a model
of someone with deep roots in the field who met considerable success outside the community of
Public Administration scholars.
In attempting to grasp the various dimensions of this failure, I offer a framework highlighting
four analytically distinct groups of Public Administration theorists (see figure 1): Reformers,
Alternativists, Normativists, and Transformationists.55 Each of these groups is engaged in what
John R. Hall (1999) calls a “formative discourse” about the field’s identity crises – that is, each
considers the issues within a particular definition of the problem.
What these four groups have in common is a bias against turning Public Administration into a
logical positivist social science. To understand their different perspectives on this issue, it is
useful to distinguish between two general criticisms levied against naturalistic models of
scientific research such as logical positivism. On the one hand, there are criticisms focused on
the technical limitations of natural science methodologies. Here the challenge is to the capacity
of such methods to live up to the declared criteria of objectivity. On the other hand, there are
critics who draw attention to the social, ideological, and political dangers inherent in adopting
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Figure 1. Gatekeeping Theories in Public Administration
Problems with “Social Scientific” Methods
Technical
Perceived Possibility for an
Acceptable Social Science

High
Low

Reformists
(Methodology)
Alternativists
(Epistemology)

Social, Political,
Ideological Implications
Normativists
(Ethics)
Transformationists
(Ontology)

the “value-neutral” perspective of a logical positivist science. A further distinction can also be
drawn within each of these two groups, differentiating between those who believe that a social
science is still possible despite the noted problems and those who are more pessimistic about
such possibilities.
The resulting framework offers a useful means for examining and assessing the recent work of
Public Administrationists. Those who fall in the upper left quadrant include a range of writers
who consider the problems of achieving disciplinary status as technical and resolvable. Their
focus is on methodology. They remain advocates for an identity rooted in the mainstream social
sciences, and they focus their efforts on modifying and “reforming” methods and approaches to
make mainstream social science more acceptable to Public Administrationists – and vice versa.
In contrast, those in the lower right quadrant adopt a far less optimistic view, concluding that
nothing less than a radical and continuous transformation of our worldview will suffice. The
challenge is ontological, and demands nothing less than a rethinking of our thoughts about the
role of government and the behavior of those engaged in the practice of public administration
Although a number of labels can be used for this group, I will use the term “transformationists”
to reflect their primary agenda for the field.
In the lower left quadrant are those who believe that mainstream social science provides a
narrow and incomplete perspective for our understanding of the world of public administration.
For them, the objective is to legitimize “alternative” approaches to studying and understanding
our subject, creating a diversity of acceptable tools – even if this means going beyond the
boundaries of approaches acceptable to mainstream social scientists. For them the problems
facing Public Administration are epistemological.
Finally, there are those who believe that the pervasive and powerful ideological forces that
dominate the mainstream social science perspective can be overcome through the integration of
appropriate norms and values in research and analysis. Members of this group will be termed
“normativists,” reflecting the high priority they give to ethical issues in the work of Public
Administrationists.
Reforming Methodists
For the theorists I have termed “reformers,” Public Administration cannot as yet regard itself as
a part of the social science “truth community” because the field has yet to demonstrate a
commitment to relevant disciplinary standards as the criteria for conducting and assessing the
research of its members. From the reformist perspective, therefore, the challenge facing Public
Administration is to deal with the methodological problems that pose obstacles to joining the
broader community.
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From this perspective, it is more than merely a matter of exercising the “will” to be disciplinary.
Rather, there is an emphasis on adopting those standards without explicitly challenging the
basic anti-positivist premise that defines the field. In lieu of a more radical critique of the
research in the field, the reformers choose to focus on adjustments in methods to “fit” the
distinctive qualities of the field’s core subject matter. In addition, the reformist position also
stresses the need for greater methodological competency for researchers, as if to argue that there
would be a greater appreciation of social scientific approaches if only more Public
Administrationists were competent to conduct such research.
On the first point – and despite the mythology of a common commitment to some idealized
scientific methodology – the reformers have lots of allies within the scientific community to
support their contentions. The shortcomings of “naïve” inductive approaches and covering-law
explanations have long been acknowledged in the natural sciences, as has the “theorydependence” of empirical observations (see Chalmers, 1994). Physicists studying quantum
mechanics since Werner Heisenberg posited his “uncertainty principle” in 1927 have
acknowledged the inherent limitations of scientific observation (Cassidy, 1992; see also Matson,
1964). Although a few hardline empiricists remain (Wilson, 1998; see also Horgan, 1997), most
scientists conduct their research with an understanding that their methods and instruments are
necessarily imperfect and that a good deal of what they do involves “tacit knowledge” (Polanyi,
1962).
Nor would many “mainstream” social scientists argue that their methods live up to the arbitrary
and unrealistic standards associated with extreme forms of logical positivism. For most, the
logical positivist perspective is a stereotyped distortion of what social scientists actually assume
and how they act. Social science research is, instead, perceived as an effort to deal with the
limitations and uncertainties inherent in studying human social behavior. It is in that
intellectual context that reformist theorists in Public Administration of remain committed to the
view that their field is capable of dealing with the limits of social science research and should
operate as a social science discipline through a variety of “reforms.”
Which leads to the second, related issue of researcher competency. If social science involves
doing research applying methods that deal with methodological limitations and uncertainties,
then any field aspiring to disciplinary status must provide its scholars with the relevant training
and promote the appropriate standards for conducting and publishing that research. Public
Administration, in short, must reform its education of Ph.D. students and adjust standards used
in the major scholarly outlets such as Public Administration Review, Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, American Review of Public Administration, and
Administration & Society.
There is nothing new about this perspective, but beyond the writings of Simon and his colleagues
fifty years ago, there has not been a major theoretical work or radical stance explicitly
supporting this position in the field in any comprehensive way – a point I will return to below.
Instead, there have been a number of efforts to prescribe what Public Administrationists must
do to achieve their status as social scientists. Specific prescriptions are, not surprisingly, related
to the particular shortcomings highlighted by each “reformer.” For some, the issue is a lack of
methodological “rigor” in Public Administration research (Cleary, 1992; Cleary & McCurdy,
1984; Perry & Kraemer, 1986). For others, there is a need for more relevant measures of what
the public sector does (Meier & Keiser, 1996). Still others believe that Public Administrationists
would undertake more “scientific” research if they understood how research is really conducted
(in contrast to the idealized model of how scientific research ought to be conducted) (Bailey,
1992). And there are those who see the answer in emerging new paradigms more conducive to
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the complex realities of the public sector (Kiel, 1994; Overman, 1996). Each of these suggested
reforms would indeed move Public Administration closer to the vague but highly desired
objective of disciplinary status as a social science – assuming, that is, we accept the reformer’s
implied or explicit standard for social science research. It is on that point that the reformist
perspective tends to disappoint.
Consider, for example, the approach assumed by Hal G. Rainey and others (e.g., Menzel &
Carson, 1999) focused on the need to systematically organize what we know about public
administration into a coherent propositional inventory that can be used to set a research agenda
for the field. The assumption is that Public Administration has access to a significant knowledge
base, but it lacks an organizing theory or focus that would create order out of the intellectual
fragments. While similar in purpose to the search for a comprehensive paradigm, this approach
does not call for radical shifts or revolutionary changes in research agendas. Instead, it seeks to
establish something like a “research program” based on existing work.
The approach can be traced back to Edwin O. Stene’s 1941 call for a more systematic approach to
the field through the development of a theory of administrative statics (as discussed above). A
decade later, Donald W. Smithburg would make an argument similar to Stene’s, noting that “the
vital scientific task of attempting to make a coherent, logically consistent system out of the
hodge-podge of sensory fact” is a critical task for the field (Smithburg, 1951, p. 68). From time
to time, the field has benefited from individual and collective efforts to develop a coherent body
of empirically testable propositions drawn from the vast knowledge base of Public
Administration and related fields. March and Simon’s (1958) Organizations, James D.
Thompson’s (1967) Organizations in Action, Rainey, Backoff, and Levine’s (1976) “Comparing
Public and Private Organizations” are three notable examples from the past.
Rainey and his coauthor Paula Steinbauer (1999) continue this tradition in their article,
“Galloping Elephants: Developing Elements of a Theory of Effective Government
Organizations” (see also Rainey, 1993a). With the explicit intention of developing “propositions
as a step toward development of a theory of effective government agencies,” Rainey searched
through various literatures focused on organizational best practices, leadership, organization
culture, and so on. Underlying this effort is the belief that a useful program of social science
research can be developed from existing knowledge about public organizations. It is a “field of
dreams” approach – if you build it (in this case, a comprehensive summary of existing
knowledge), “they” will come.
The effort to construct this intellectual field of dreams requires more than merely knowledge of
the literature. It demands the development of a framework broad enough in scope to capture the
complex dimensions of the subject as well as the many varieties of relevant research. It also
requires the capacity to discriminate among conclusions and hypotheses of such varying quality
that only a few individuals are capable of doing the job effectively. It is a task we assume we can
trust to one of the more respected intellectual gatekeepers of the field – a status no informed
scholar would deny to Professor Rainey.
However, there are at least two critical problems with Rainey's approach. First, generating
propositions is interesting and useful to the extent that it provides a summary of what others
have concluded from their research. But the resulting propositional inventory does not provide
what is necessary to establish a “research program” consistent with contemporary social science
standards. Research programs, as described by Lakotos (1970), are defined by both negative and
positive heuristics. They require hypotheses structured around empirically relevant and testable
“mechanisms,” and therefore demand propositions that make explicit assertions of links among
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variables. Rainey does note that the “concepts and relations in the propositions advanced here
need more development in a variety of ways,” but he does not elaborate (p. 28). He discusses the
possibility of paring down the list of variables for the sake of parsimony, but fails to note what
that would accomplish in terms of theory-building efforts. Finally, he speculates that “based on
the literature reviewed and cited in this article” there are certain variables (e.g., leadership,
professionalism) likely to emerge as “most important” as a result of further analysis (p. 28). But
Rainey fails to elaborate why these variables are salient for future research.
As discussed below, the frustrations associated with past theory-building efforts have shifted the
standards for social science research toward models that specify causal mechanisms and away
from models based on causal relationships. The willingness to settle for explanations based on
strong correlation has passed. Although the quality of data and statistical analysis may have
improved considerably over the past several decades (see Blalock, 1971), the fundamental fact
remains that “Correlation is no proof of causation” (Simon, 1954; also Elster, 1989). This is one
of the major reasons axiomatic theories have been widely adopted in the social sciences.56
Furthermore, even if we were willing to honor a claim for disciplinary status on the basis of
correlation-based studies, there is another fundamental problem to contend with. The literature
Rainey relies on for constructing his proposition inventory reflects findings drawn from
research using a range of methods, e.g. from carefully designed and executed empirical studies
to interpretive observations. Here Rainey’s approach is subject to a Catch-22 problem. In his
effort to create a foundation for research that meets the standards of mainstream social science,
Rainey must rely on hypotheses drawn from conclusions generated by studies that might not
meet even the most generous standards for empirical research. What emerges from this
approach is a list of hypothesized relationships of such varying quality that they are in need of
further analysis for purposes of verification.
Such is, in fact, the true value of Rainey's efforts. In gathering and organizing these propositions
in a coherent framework, Rainey enhances the potential for future research activity. Each
proposition can be regarded as an empirical and theoretical challenge. Empirically, the
challenge is to verify the hypothesized relationship regardless of the quality of research used by
its initial source. On the level of theory, the challenge is to uncover the mechanisms behind
those hypothesized relationships. Unfortunately, these challenges are unlikely to be joined
within the field. Propositional inventories such as Rainey's are more often perceived as
summaries of rather than agendas for research. Thus, despite the obvious value of Rainey's
efforts in summarizing and focusing attention on work relevant to Public Administration
research, the project falters on the lack of a clear expression of – and adherence to – relevant
standards for disciplinary-relevant social science research.
In a sense, the reformers are plagued by a fundamental belief that they need not explicitly
challenge the field’s gatekeepers. Wishing to avoid the demonization visited on Simon,57 they
see no value in confronting the powers that be with a forceful argument on behalf of positivist
research.58 Suffering from naiveté rather than arrogance, many feel they can rely on the strength
of their work alone to convince others that social science research in Public Administration is
both feasible and valuable. Thus, they complement their “field of dreams” strategy with a “just
do it” attitude.59 “One wonders,” Rainey (1993a) remarks in commentary on public management
research, “whether public administration scholars might do better in advancing both the
identity of the field and its research and theory if fewer of us ruminated on these topics and
more of us simply identified important theoretical and research questions and worked on
providing useful answer to them” (p. 9).
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Enthralled with Alternatives
The group I term “alternativists” are, like the reformers, concerned about the technical
problems plaguing those who attempt to apply scientific methods to the study of human
behavior. Where they differ, however, is their assessment of the potential for adjusting
mainstream scientific methodology to studies of public administration. In this regard, they often
share with the “normativists” and “transformationists” a critical suspicion of what Guy B.
Adams calls “technical rationality” – a pervasive characteristic of modernity that must be
countered if we are to improve our knowledge of public administration (Adams, 1992).
Technical rationality is not perceived as an ideological problem among alternativists, but rather
as a major epistemological constraint on our ability to understand the phenomena we are
investigating.
The alternativist view of social science is thus somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, there is
considerable respect expressed for what social science methodology seeks to achieve and the
standards used in the effort.60 On the other hand, alternativists are not optimistic that more
rigor, comprehensive paradigms, more relevant measures, etc. will make a significant difference
in the advancement of Public Administration knowledge. Put simply, for them the issues are not
methodological but rather epistemological.61 What the alternativists have in common is the
belief that social science approaches must be complemented, supplemented, or even replaced by
alternative (i.e., non-positivistic social science) methodologies if we are truly understand
human social behavior.62
Among Public Administrationists, a major statement on both the epistemological issues and
possible solutions was articulated by Jay D. White and Guy B. Adams (1994b) in their
introductory essay to Research in Public Administration: Reflections on Theory and Practice.
After arguing the fundamental flaws of positivism (in the form of a pervasive “technical
rationality”), White and Adams also note the drawbacks for (“threats to”) knowledge
development inherent in the postmodern critique (see discussion of transformationists below).
What they prescribe instead is that the field learned to live with epistemological “diversity.”
We are persuaded by the weight of historical and epistemological
evidence that no single approach – even if accorded the highly
positive label science – is adequate for the conduct of research in
public administration. If research is to be guided by reason, a
diversity of approaches, honoring both practical and theoretical
reason, seems necessary. Thus we want to suggest that knowledge
and theory development in public administration should proceed
in many ways, including hypothesis testing, case studies, analyses
of administrative or policy processes, historical interpretations of
the field or parts of it, deductible arguments, philosophical
critiques, and personal reflections on administrative experiences.
(White & Adams, 1994b, p. 19-20)
Alternativist efforts have focused on three general alternatives to the mainstream social science
epistemology: historicism, interpretivism, and critical theory. While all three approaches are
credited with useful insights, none claims to fit within standards for valid knowledge and theory
development demanded by the positivist social science community. Historicism has been
subject to the most elaborate consideration on this point. Karl R. Popper’s (1964) systematic
critique of the logic underlying various forms of historicism has proven decisive in the eyes of
many social scientists, and even its strongest advocates admit to its shortcomings within the
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sphere of social science research (see Tinder, 1961). Interpretive methodologies have gained
considerable respect for the insights they provide, but even its leading practitioner
(anthropologist Clifford Geertz) admits that it poses a challenge to the standards of mainstream
social research (Geertz, 1974).63 Critical theory approaches are explicitly designed to highlight
the structures of power and tensions that lie beneath the surface of social life (see Bohman, 1991;
Hayes, 1994), but their reliance on critical frameworks (e.g., neo-Marxist and Freudian
analytics) as well as the implied commitment to action directly (and intentionally) challenges
the basic premises of positivist social science (see Comstock, 1994).
Thus, despite the implied openness to and tolerance of64 various methods and epistemological
perspectives, alternativist theorists are unable – an often explicitly unwilling – to generate the
kind of research agenda or quality of research conducive to disciplinary status among the social
sciences. As a consequence, the impact of alternativist prescriptions has been to push Public
Administration increasingly toward a relativistic position on questions of epistemology (see
Miller, 1972), and toward identification with the humanities through the application of
epistemologies more closely associated with those disciplines. Alternativists thereby challenge us
to confront the field’s identity issues directly by highlighting the value the humanities-based
research as a means providing practitioners with useful knowledge and insights about being
public administrators.
Historicist research in Public Administration has been increasing in recent years. As Larry Luton
notes, much of this work was driven by an effort to improve the field’s self-image and to offer
exemplary models from the past that can be emulated (Luton, 1999). But there are Public
Administration scholars using historical analysis as a means for enhancing both the field’s
knowledge base and theory development. The work of Stivers (1995) and Schachter (1995) have
raise questions and offered new insights into the progressive roots of the field, while John Rohr
(1986) and David H. Rosenbloom (1998) use historical analysis for greater understanding of the
constitutional and legal foundations of contemporary administrative issues.65
Regarding interpretive approaches (see Farmer, 1995), there is a long history associated
primarily with "case study" teaching methods. More recently Jay D. White (1992), Ralph
Hummel (1991), and others66 have pointed out the value of narratives and storytelling in
enhancing the understanding of public administration for managers, and Hummel makes the
case that managerial storytelling needs the criteria for validity in the social sciences. Pursuing
that argument, he and David Carnevale have developed an approach they call “knowledge
analytics.”
Critical theory has played less of a role in the field until very recently. Among the leading
theorists in the field, Ralph P. Hummel (1994), and Robert B. Denhardt (1981) established the
value of such an approach in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The most recent application of this
approach is found in Adams and Balfour’s (1998) Unmasking Administrative Evil (UAE).
Because of the attention this work has received in the field, I will focus on it as an example of
the problems the alternativist position poses for Public Administration as a social science.
The authors of UAE are quite clear about the epistemological foundations and methodological
strategies driving their work. For too long, they argue, Public Administration has been avoiding
its past, or has operated under the influence of a biased perspective (i.e., “technical rationality”)
that has distorted the field’s historical consciousness.67 An “objective” social science would be
blind to the historical truth, and so would any historical analysis that has fallen under the spell
of modernity. Critical historical studies are needed to offset the intellectual damage done by our
obsession with the “technical rationality” inherent in modernist epistemology. “If critical,
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historically based studies were in the forefront of public administration research, we could more
readily consider questions crucial to the present and future configuration of public
administration, and to administrative evil” (Adams & Balfour, 1998, p. 51).
Like all critical theory analysts, Adams and Balfour begin by articulating a framework that can
be applied to describing the genesis and maintenance of the social situation being studied (see
Comstock 1994/1982). For this they rely on “object-relations psychology,” a major form of postFreudian psychoanalysis, and specifically the writings of Melanie Klein (1882-1960), who
stressed how an individual’s emotional life is rooted in basic orientations toward objects formed
during earliest childhood (see Smith, 1997; Segal, 1988).
Object-relations psychology focuses on the tensions we first encounter as infants as we develop
both positive and negative feelings toward others, and Klein took note of a particular
mechanism – projective identification – people use to deal with those tensions as they grow
older. By “splitting off” our good from our bad feelings and projecting the bad onto external
“objects,” we are able to obtain some relief but at a cost of how we relate to those others.
Internalized resolutions (as an alternative to projective identification) are also problematic (i.e.,
leading to depression and other psychological maladies), although they would stop the individual
from hateful and aggressive behavior toward the “other.” For critical theorists who adopt this
controversial model, projective identification joins with the forces of modern organizational life
to produce the social evil we see in today’s world. Adams and Balfour elaborate such a theory of
evil – in their case, administrative evil – rooted in the structure and dynamics provided through
Kleinian analytics (Adams & Balfour, 1998). Modern organizations and institutions, they argue,
are “holding environments for evil.”
People who need direction – a target, really – for their
unintegrated rage and aggression, who must split off the “bad”
and projecting it outward, hear all too well the siren call of groups
of organizations that will contain this psychic energy for them.
The price tag is almost always obedience and loyalty, and
sometimes moral inversion; occasionally, the price tag is very
dear indeed – those truly evil eruptions that become the great
moral debacles of human history. (Adams & Balfour, 1998, p. 27)
A major obstacle to the acceptance of critical theory and other alternativist epistemologies by
mainstream social science is obvious in the Adams and Balfour adoption of this analytic
framework: there is no evidence or rationale provided to support the acceptance of this
particular framework for analysis. The framework seems merely to be presumed appropriate.
The willingness to make such a major presumption seems reinforced by an interesting assertion
made by the authors after briefly introducing the Kleinian theory. “However true to life one
wishes to consider object-relations psychology to the inner workings of the infant mind (and
there is controversy over this issue), for our purposes, what is important is the way these
insights help us understand the construction of social and organizational evil in adults” (Adams
& Balfour, 1998, p. 10). What Adams and Balfour are saying, in essence, is that we ought to
accept their judgment that this is appropriate and relevant perspective from which to view
modern public administrative life. “Trust us,” they seem to argue, and let’s see where this critical
theory leads. There is no presentation of evidence, only a demonstration through application
that this framework seems to make sense of the world and therefore is as valid as any other
framework, period.
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For mainstream social science, such an approach seems nothing less than arbitrary and
unwarranted. It is a criticism that can be applied to historical and interpretivist analyses as well
(e.g., see Jones, 1998; Popper, 1964). The only similar approach taken within the mainstream –
Milton Friedman’s controversial assertion that economic theories should be judged on how well
they make predictions rather than on the validity of their assumptions (Friedman, 1953) –
cannot stand as a relevant analogy since its acceptance ultimately rests on how well it meets an
empirically verifiable standard. Critical theories do not seek such assessments. They only assert
that the field should follow their arbitrary lead and see where it takes them.
Still another issue about these approaches well illustrated by UAE is the lax attitude toward
conceptual clarity, especially in regard to central concepts. In UAE, the importance of “evil” as
an idea cannot be overstated. And yet there is an almost intentional effort to keep the meaning
of the term ambiguous. What exactly do they mean by “evil”? The authors spend surprisingly too
little time on this question, relying vaguely on approach that regards it as behavior that is
“destructive to others.” This definition, they contend, “suggests a continuum, with horrible,
mass eruptions of evil, such as the Holocaust and other, lesser instances of mass murder, at one
extreme, and ‘small’ white lies, which is somewhat hurtful, at the other.” Their focus for the
analysis is on the bloodier extreme (Adams & Balfour, 1998, p. 2-3). A good deal more energy is
put into discussing where administrative evil comes from (e.g., technical rationality), how it
escapes detection, and the role of organizations and institutions as “holding environments for
evil”.
By an interesting coincidence, the question of “evil” and its role in the historical analysis of the
Holocaust was the subject of two intensive examinations published just after UAE, and the
complications of using the term are evidenced throughout both (see Copjec, 1996; Rosenbaum,
1998). What we discover is that conceptually, evil is so ambiguous that the concept of evil may
actually detract from our ability to understand and assess human behavior. Perhaps more
important, there are dangers in using such a concept carelessly. For example, the use of term to
broadly characterize a group or a set of behaviors by a group (e.g., “administrative evil”) may
itself generate reactions that can lead to scapegoating and destructive behavior. Such careless
labeling for the sake of enhancing their critical analysis is all the more surprising since the
authors demonstrate an awareness of the power of stereotyping (e.g., the comparison between
the rhetoric of welfare reform in the U.S. and the Nazi characterization of Jews [see Adams &
Balfour, 1998]).
Having set the conceptual stage, Adams and Balfour apply the logic of their critical perspective
to examples of administrative evil that thread their way from the Holocaust to the Vietnam
War, the Challenger accident, and beyond (Adams & Balfour, 1998). Here as well, the rather
loose standards of research acceptable to many alternativists – and anathema to mainstream
social science – become evident and significant. Despite the stress placed by Adams and Balfour
on the need for greater attention to historical evidence to enhance our understanding of public
administration, the history in UAE is used rather than analyzed. That is, history is used as
source of case study material for applying a pre-supposed critical perspective rather than as the
source of evidence from which patterns and insights about the field might be derived or the
critical theory framework might be tested and evaluated.68 While historical studies of the
Holocaust, the Challenger accident, and other cases are relied upon (e.g., Robert McNamara's
role in transforming the Defense Department), the material is mined selectively for the purpose
of demonstrating and promoting a particular view of the authors.
Such analytic strategies are necessary and acceptable when applying a critical theory approach,
for the assumption of critical theorists is that the world of appearances is misleading and the
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task of the scholar is to “reveal the lie.”69 Therefore, this particular complaint might be
dismissed as merely a statement of the obvious. After all, as the title of the book states, the
authors intended all along to “unmask” administrative evil. Nevertheless, throughout the book
the authors imply that the theory of administrative evil is not merely a critical interpretation of
history, but is rather a historical fact that emerges from the careful study of administrative
behavior. And what is the purpose of uncovering this historical fact? Is it for the purposes of
knowledge development and/or theory building?
The answer is found in a characteristic of critical theory analysis that differentiates it from other
alternativist approaches: its acceptance of a liberationist function for research. Critical theory
analysts are committed to more than insight and understanding; they seek to raise the
consciousness of those they determine (through analysis) to be dominated and repressed with
the idea that such analyses will prove therapeutic if not liberating. Denhardt (1981) articulates
this as the “activist stance”:
In both the Marxist and Freudian traditions, we see the suffering
of the individual and the society has the key to reconstructive
(revolutionary?) action. It is through our remembrance of the
pleasures which reality denies that we see our true condition, and
it is through the recognition of the alienation which marks our
existence that we are motivated to move in opposition to the
powers which holds us. For this reason, our suffering must not be
“rationalized” away, for it remains at the heart of our “spiritual”
quest; it is to transcend our suffering that we act. (Denhardt,
1981, p. 115-116)
For Adams and Balfour, the implications of their analysis should include a “new basis for ethics”
in public administration, one that would lead administrators to actively resist administrative evil
in its many and pervasive forms.
Administrative evil lurks where governments seek to solve social
problems using the technical-rational expertise of professionals,
in the absence of a vital and active political community. A new
basis for ethics is needed that does not demand individual
conformity to the procedures of technical-rational solutions to
social problems, but that instead he engages administrators as
citizens in an ongoing effort to promote and sustained an
inclusive democratic polity. (Adams & Balfour, 1998, p. 160)
If the purpose of accepting alternative epistemologies is to enhance our capacity to understand
the phenomena we study, analyses conducted using those alternatives should be subject to
assessment for their contribution to “knowledge development” (a position, it must be reemphasized, that is closely associated with the writings of Professor Adams). Like other analyses
using the critical theory approach, UAE offers us provocative insights and generates much
needed reflection and discussion among both scholars and practitioners. But does it contribute
to knowledge development in the sense of enhancing our understanding of public
administration? Critics of the critical theory epistemology argue that the approach obscures and
diverts the search for knowledge and understanding – that rather than “revealing the lie,”
critical theory imposes its own distortions.
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It is, of course, unfair to challenge the entire range of alternativist research by focusing on the
problems inherent in one study. However, from the perspective of mainstream social science,
most of the problems characterizing UAE can be found in historicist and interpretivist studies as
well. The field of Public Administration seems unlikely to achieve disciplinary status as a social
science so long as its scholars defer to alternativist epistemologies.
Spirited Public Administration
Among the four groups in this analysis, those I term “normativists” come closest to the views of
Dwight Waldo during his debates with Simon. The issues are not framed in anti-scientific terms
per se, but are focused on the drawbacks and dangers of value-neutrality in the study of
governmental administration. The holy grail of this group is a normative theory of public
administration, one based on social scientific knowledge but embracing a view of what
constitutes “good” or appropriate ends for public service. For normativist theorists, the issues
are ultimately ethical.
The efforts of Public Administration’s major theorists to establish an ethical foundation for the
field has, in fact, defined the field’s “mainstream” scholarship for decades – again, an indicator
of Waldo’s triumph. While these writings cover a wide range of alternative norms, a common
theme has been the need to articulate those primary or core values that ought to guide not just
public administration practitioners, but the community of Public Administration scholars as
well. Thus, for normativists the central problem facing those who aspire to the status of
positivist social scientist is the price paid in meeting the standards of value-neutrality and
objectivity.
It should be reemphasized that Waldo’s (1984) arguments against positivist approaches were not
that they were value-neutral, but that the claim to neutrality merely obscured the high value
placed on efficiency and rationality in administrative studies. He therefore took Simon and his
colleagues to task for the same sins that informed his critique of the “principles” and other
“orthodox” approaches to public administration. Implied in the classic politics–administration
dichotomy was the assumption that “true democracy and true efficiency are synonymous, or at
least reconcilable (p. 199),” and that by enhancing the business end of that identity (efficiency)
one is also enhancing the political (democracy). Opposition to this assumption energized
Waldo’s work and led him to strive for development of a “democratic theory of public
administration.” The role of such a theory is laid out clearly in the conclusion of The
Administrative State where he discusses the challenges facing America’s democratic society as it
becomes increasingly reliant on government by experts.
Closely related is the problem of providing adequate preparation
and a “philosophy” for our administrators. Are training in the
mechanics of administration and codes of professional ethics
enough? Or should our new Guardian Class be given an education
commensurate with their announced responsibilities and perhaps
be imbued with a political philosophy? The present gap between
the content of our administrative curricula and what we announce
to be the responsibilities of our Administrators in appalling.
Presuming that we are in the midst of some sort of “managerial
revolution,” can we say that either the problem of our philosophy
about managers or philosophy for managers has been adequately
treated? (Waldo, 1984, p. 202)
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With these words, Waldo sets the standard that Public Administration’s normativst theorists
have been seeking to achieve for more than half a century. Any legitimate theory for public
administration must go beyond the empiricism and data-driven models of positivist social
science; it must give priority to the purposes and values of the democratic society it serves.
There are various exemplars of the normativist approach to Public Administrationist theory,
and the approach includes entire movements (e.g., “The New Public Administration” of the early
1970s, the “Blacksburg Manifesto Movement” dating from the early 1980s) as well as
individuals. Two recent and quite notable publications provide explicit examples: H. George
Frederickson’s The Spirit of Public Administration and Louis C. Gawthrop’s Public Service and
Democracy. Both are interesting books for the quality and consistency of their respective
arguments, but for present purposes we will focus on their perspectives on the purpose and role
of Public Administration, particularly in regard to the role of theory and research.
Although a composite of old and new essays, Frederickson’s (1997) book carries a powerful
theme and purpose stated in the first major chapter: the need for a “theory of the public in
public administration.” Frederickson posits service to the public as the central value of public
administration in general, and after assessing five different academic “perspectives” on the
public (pluralist, public choice, legislative/representation, service providing, and citizenship),
he calls for the adoption of a “general theory” of the public in public administration
designed not just for the purpose of theory development but also
to guide those in public service. Because it is to be used by those
who must make government work, such a theory must be
practical. It should also be empirically based – and, of course, it
must further the interests of the public both specifically and
generally. (Frederickson, 1997, p. 44)
Each of the other models “contribute in some general way” to such a theory, but none is complete
and “when taken together they still suffer from significant omissions” (Frederickson, 1997, p.
44). What is required is a theory that gives priority to the values of public service.
An equally strong normativist stance is assumed by Gawthrop (1998). While his latest work is
focused primarily on the practice of (rather than the study of) public administration, he has
little respect for those who directly or indirectly promote rationalistic, technocratic, detached,
objective criteria for describing, explaining or assessing the work of public administrators. He is
especially critical of any social theory that is morally vacuous – which is to say, most
contemporary social theory. Citing Reinhold Niebuhr’s contention that “every moral theory
insists on the goodness of benevolence, Justice, kindness, and unselfishness,” Gawthrop (1998,
p. 155) notes that contemporary social theories do not meet that standard.
…[A]s we enter the twenty-first century, we seem to be
mesmerized by the notion of theory to the point where theory is
the only reality countenanced by our society. In whichever policy
arena the public manager happens to be situated, whether it is
law enforcement, healthcare, education, housing, and so on, there
is no dearth of micro, macro, or meta theories to distract
attention from the empirical realities that reveal the slow but
steady degeneration of our ethical-moral values. Theory, not
religion, has become the opiate of our society. Indeed, the ethicalmoral “theories” advanced over the centuries by philosophers and
91

Journal of Public and Nonprofit Affairs
theologians have been relegated to the dustbins in the cellar of the
edifice constructed by the twentieth century’s new “sciences” of
social life…Despite the intellectual rigor, precision, and rational
certitude presumably associated with the process of theory
building, the fact remains that the deeply rooted moral
dimensions of democratic society are effectively disregarded and
functionally distorted by most of our elegant and sophisticated
sociopolitical theories. (Gawthrop, 1998, p. 155-157)
For both Frederickson and Gawthrop, the essence of public administration and public service
cannot be captured by a Public Administration that does not itself capture the field’s “spirit.”
For Gawthrop, the focus of his volume is “on the ethical-moral values and virtues that pervade
the spirit of democracy and constitute the pathways to the common good. The core argument
advanced is that these values and virtues must function as guideposts and benchmarks for those
who serve in the name of democracy” (Gawthrop, 1998, p. xii). For Frederickson, the “spirit” in
his book’s title “is a deep and enduring commitment to the calling of public service and to the
effective conduct of public organizations and their work.”
The spirit of public administration combines rational and
empirical forms of knowledge or ways of knowing with an
understanding of the field built on experience, wisdom, and
judgment. Rational assumptions and the traditions of social
science research are essential to the creation of reliable and
replicable theories of public administration. But theories that are
derived solely from rational assumptions and social science
methods may be unable to account for important forces in the
field, such as compassion, courage, and benevolence. The aim of
The Spirit of Public Administration is first to guide the reader to
a knowledge of the field, and second and more important, to
attempt to further an understanding of the field. (Frederickson,
1997, p. 2-3)
The focus of these two prominent normativists on “spirit” is not without precedent in the history
of the social sciences. From the Renaissance until the 19th-century, spirits and “humours” were
taken seriously as causal mediates through which distinct parts of nature and human nature
(e.g., the intellect and body) were connected. For centuries, it served as the social science
equivalent of the physicists’ concept of “ether.”70 In the work of Hegel and other idealists, spirit
took on the characteristics of a higher morality that becomes real through its apprehension and
activation by individuals (Smith, 1997). In stressing the spiritual nature of public service values,
both Frederickson and Gawthrop indicate that what they seek is more than a mere commitment
to duty, obligation, objectivity, and so on. For them there must be strong moral substantive
content in any theory of public administration worthy of the name. There is certainly no room
for a value free or value neutral approach to the study of Public Administration.
In setting these normative standards for Public Administration as a social science, the
normativist position makes it difficult – if not very uncomfortable – for any social scientist
committed to mainstream standards who attempts to conduct research or undertake empirical
theory development within the confines of the field. American social scientists are neither
ignorant of, nor indifferent to, the role of values in research. It is a problem traced to Kant’s
observations about the limits of pure reason, and specifically the inevitable role of values in
efforts to comprehend history. By the late 19th century, the role of values had become a major
debate among European social scientists, and emerging from that milieu was the Weberian ideal
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of value neutrality that has dominated as the methodological mainstream standard.71 It is a
position that acknowledges the relevance of values and cultural influences on the research
endeavor, but seeks commitment to methods that minimize their impact.
In the tradition of Waldo's critique of Simon, the normativists stress standards calling for value
commitments that would guide research – a position clearly at odds with the mainstream social
science position on the rules of inquiry. Intentionally or not, the strong normativist position set
two related litmus tests for acceptable Public Administration research: first, does your research
acknowledge the priority of values in public administrative behavior, and, second, are those
values in sync with the norms of the major gatekeepers in the field? With the normativist
position perceived as dominant by those outside the Public Administration community, those
identifying with the social science mainstream avoid presentations and publications in Public
Administration venues.72
Some of the problem can be attributed to exaggerated misperceptions among “outsiders”
regarding the standards of research for Public Administration. But the strong and pervasive
position articulated by leading normativist theorists is also a likely factor. Consider, for
example, Frederickson's critical treatment of various attempts by a number of scholars to
conceptualize what is emerging today as “public administration as governance.” “Any serious
student of the field,” he argues, “will recognize that the use of the word and concept governance
to describe public administration is laden with problems – both of practice or application and of
conceptual rigor “(Frederickson, 1997, p. 87). Intentionally or not, Frederickson's use of ad
hominem argument reflects an inherent bias in the strong normativist stance to be dismissive of
those who do not agree, i.e., a “serious” student is someone who agrees with Frederickson’s
position, while those who disagree (by seeing some value in the concept) can be dismissed as
“not serious.” Frederickson also seems unwilling to explicitly distinguish between those who
apply the concept prescriptively from those who seek to apply it descriptively. In what amounts
to criticism that “shoots the messenger,” he seems unwilling to tolerate the conceptualization
even when articulated for analytic purposes.
At the same time, the normativist does see the benefits empirical research that is accomplished
in the service of moral theory. Frederickson's book is filled with mainstream social science
research citations supportive of his positions. In addition, we find Frederickson outlining a
research agenda that would enhance our understanding of the role of ethics in public
administration, including descriptive and comparative studies of ethical “settings, professions,
and cultures”; assessments of efforts to enforce, enhance, and teach ethical behavior; and
studies of how privatization and administrative discretion impact public administration ethics
(Frederickson, 1997). (Ironically, Frederickson would expect that such research would live up to
the standards of mainstream social science. More important, however, it is the fact that it is
research in the service of a normative agenda that legitimizes it.)
Which brings me to a major reason for arguing that the normativist has failed to enhance the
disciplinary status of Public Administration within the social sciences. When all is said and
done, the normativist perspective promotes rhetoric rather than research. Mainstream social
scientists will argue that the normativists impose a non-scientific agenda on Public
Administration research. The role of research is not merely – or primarily – to serve knowledge
development or theory building, but rather to serve the rhetorical needs of a particular moral
theory posited by the normativist.
This is not to argue that rhetoric is an insignificant or unworthy endeavor. I am not referring
here to the thin, sophistic form of rhetoric associated with arguments intended to hide or distort
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the truth. Instead, I am referring to the Aristotelian form of rhetoric developed to make
persuasive arguments on behalf of a point of view. It is a form of inquiry with a long, honorable,
and productive history that, some would argue, remains central to our search for knowledge
despite the pretenses of scientific methodology.73
Nor am I contending that research about public administration conducted in the social science
mainstream lacks normative content or purpose. Wood and Waterman’s (1994) Bureaucratic
Dynamics, for instance, is a work reflecting the quality of research expected under mainstream
social science standards, and yet contains significant normative themes relating to questions of
responsiveness and accountability. In fact, a good deal of research about public administration
done by those who would not identify themselves as members of the Public Administration
community is initiated in response to normative issues.74 And most conclude their works with
prescriptions reflecting values and norms not unlike those advocated in the normativist
literature of Public Administration.
My contention is that the influence of the strong normativist position in Public Administration
reduces the incentives for those engaged in mainstream social science research too identify with
our field. A work such as Bureaucratic Dynamics should be more closely identify with Public
Administration, and perhaps would have benefited considerably from interactions with the
field. Nevertheless, the work was clearly written to the standards of the mainstream social
science community with which the authors identify, i.e. political science. An important indicator
supporting this judgment are the relatively few citations to Public Administration research
found in the eleven-page reference section (Wood & Waterman, 1994). Of those citations
recognizable as associated with the field of Public Administration, almost all would be regarded
as classics from the era when political science and Public Administration were considered
inseparably one. And despite its direct relevance to an issue high on the normativist agenda in
our field – as indicated by the work’s subtitle: “The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy” – all
the scholarly papers that eventually comprised the core research in the book were published in
mainstream political science journals rather than those associated with Public Administration.
Under the influence of normativist standards, analysts who in every other respect are
committed to promoting the values of democratic administration and public service, are subject
to criticism for conducting studies or developing theories that do not have a stronger normative
content guiding their work. It is not a matter of whether detached and value free research is
possible; it is more a question of whether the research explicitly fosters the appropriate values.
Despite courteous bows in the direction of empirical researchers, neither Frederickson nor
Gawthrop nor many other normativists would give due credit to research or theory building that
is not politically correct or ideologically in-sync or socially sensitized.75
Of course, this assessment is vulnerable to charges of over statement about the standards of
social science and over generalization about the power and influence of normativist writers in
the field. The strong normativist position represented by Frederickson and Gawthrop has its
equivalent within mainstream social science (see Wolfe, 1989), although its influence is muted
within positivist arenas. And within Public Administration there are subtler normativist
positions less likely to give the impression that research in the field must be subsumed under
some dominant value structure. Nevertheless, the strong normativist position has both history
and status on its side within the field. If Public Administration is to attain acceptance as a social
science, the power and influence of the normativist gatekeepers needs to be addressed.
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Transforming the Field
Finally, we consider those Public Administration theorists who believe that the positivist agenda
in its varying forms is pernicious in its capacity to misdirect research and blind the field to the
true nature of public administration's role in society. For this group of writers, nothing less than
an ontological transformation will suffice to deal with the resulting problems. The very ideas of
developing methodological, epistemological, or ethical solutions is dismissed in favor of opening
up the “worldview” of Public Administrationists through development of new languages and a
new consciousness.
Ironically, the transformationist goal is quite similar to that articulated by Simon in his efforts
to re-orient Public Administration in the 1940s. He, too, sought a revolution in the way scholars
approach administrative questions, not only through the adoption of the logical positivist
epistemology, but also by re-focusing the conceptual and logical foundations of the field toward
decision-making. The contemporary transformationists cast a wider net as they seek to replace
the modernist ontology that has dominated the field (at the least in United States) since the
Progressive Era. In so doing, they target not only Simon, but Waldo and Taylor and Gulick and
the Blacksburg Movement and Gawthrop – and just about anyone else who consciously or
unconsciously relies on the world-as-defined-by-modernity perspective.
An early explication of this approach was offered in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Orion F.
White, Jr. and Cynthia J. McSwain (1983).76 Building on Jungian analytic psychology, they
argued for a broader ontological foundation in the study of public organizations – one that
would extend the reach of scholarly analysis from the positivist focus on structures and social
relations to the depths of the human psyche and the collective and individual unconscious
(White & McSwain, 1982).77 As noted below, White and McSwain (writing as O. C. McSwite
[1997] ) remain active contributors to the transformationist perspective; today, however, they
are joined by the growing number of Public Administrationists who identify themselves as
postmodernists.
In articulating the postmodernist approach in the field, Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller argue
that “prevailing ontologies” are central to Public Administration's inability to deal with key
issues. The very categories we use to think about public administration results in bias and
distortion.
[T]oo much is assumed by prevailing ontologies – too much is
assumed about the rationality of human nature, about the
concreteness of organizations and institutions, about the
consensus around organizational goals, and about the solidity of
the key concepts and variables that shape public administration
thought. We try to back away from as many of these assumptions
as possible, and even goes so far as to allow that “reality” itself is
neither concrete nor objective, but constructed by humans and
hence malleable. In the process of backing away from these
underlined assumptions, we come to understand that many of the
categories that we uncritically employ in daily discourse far
reifications, that is, socially constructed categories that are
mistaken for things that exist “out there” in the world of
“objective reality.” (Fox & Miller, 1995, p. 8)
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David John Farmer explains the perspective in terms of the various languages used by public
administration theorists and practitioners, and like others who adopt this approach he notes that
a “sea change is necessary” if Public Administration (and the other social sciences) are to
improve their understanding of governing. “Without such a root-and-branch shift in the
foundations of an understanding of public administration, treatment of the sort of questions we
want answered will remain unsatisfactory” (Farmer, 1995, p. 4).
As an intellectual movement, postmodernism is difficult to capture analytically, and many of its
leading advocates would argue against efforts to do so.78 Emerging from a variety of sources, it
has taken many forms and is likely to take many more before its influence is spent. But most
share a common belief that society is in the throes of a change from a modernity rooted in the
Enlightenment toward a future that (thus far) lacks firm intellectual grounding. For some
observers (e.g., Peter Drucker [1969]79), the postmodern era held the promise of positive change
as society and the economy moved away from bureaucratic and industrial cultures and toward a
more open knowledge-based society. The first reactions to the prospect of emerging postmodern
conditions reflected an optimistic view of modern management’s ability to deal with the
challenges it might generate – even in the public sector (Caldwell, 1975). Most contemporary
postmodernists, however, expressed anxiety about these developments. The alienating and
dehumanizing conditions fostered under modernity’s obsessive application of rationalistic
techniques (see Ellul, 1964) are regarded as pervasive influences, and many forecast that life
under postmodern conditions will lack meaning or direction.
Among those who perceive the postmodern world with anxiety, there are at least two major and
somewhat opposing outlooks. In presenting an overview of the postmodern influence in the
social sciences, Pauline Marie Rosenau distinguishes between “skeptics” and “affirmatives.” At
their most extreme, skeptics regard the emerging postmodern condition has inevitable and
unstoppable (at least short of revolutionary action). In contrast, the affirmatives hold out hope
that through radical alteration of the way we think about our lives, we can create a more
humane and livable world (Rosenau, 1992).80
In their respective analyses of how we think about public administration, the works of Fox and
Miller and O. C. McSwite reflect a critical view of current conditions, but ultimately they assume
the tone of the affirmatives in proposing transformational strategies. Fox and Miller focus on
the need to rethink how we think about bureaucracy and American democracy. The problem, as
they see it, lies in existing ontological constraints making it impossible for us to even think
about public administration as an active force in a truly open and democratic system. After
reviewing the shortcomings of various modernist perspectives in dealing with the challenge of
the postmodern condition, Fox and Miller write of the need to “theorize ourselves out of the culde-sac of postmodernism” through development of a “constructivist discourse theory” intended
to valorize proactive participation of public administrators
intermingled with others of public-minded communities in policy
networks, interagency consortia, adhocracies, and task forces.
These we take to be the appropriate loci for a potential public
sphere. Such extra-legislative policy forums… are, however,
rendered through the lenses of orthodoxy as thefts of sovereignty
– more, the ascendance of technocracy. Although we have laid
some licks on orthodoxy and its alternatives, we've required a
newly engineer epistemology/ontology to affirm a discourse
alternative. (Fox & Miller, 1995, p. 78)
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For McSwite, the goal is to reinvigorate a long suppressed constitutional ethos rooted in colonial
traditions, manifested in the Articles of Confederation, fundamental to both populist and
progressive ideas, and implied “in the present moment has postmodernism.” Their path
involves the creation of an alternative to what they label the “Man of Reason method,” and it
takes the form of a “collaborative pragmatism” that would rely on relationships rather than
reason to determined collective action or resolve differences.
We can make a world by developing the kind of relationships with
each other that allow us to figure out what we want to do next.
Our shared purpose does not have to be a grand “once and for alltime” purpose, which is to say, and ideological purpose. Indeed,
purposes like this quickly lose their vitality and die because they
become appropriated by consciousness and cannot continue to
create things. This is what happens when people start quarreling
over whether what they are doing is really progress. The purposes
I mean are simply iterative, tentatively experimental choices
about what we want to try doing next. If we, in short, can agree on
something that we want to do next and set about doing it, then we
do not need to worry. Our subsequent actions will create the
world. At bottom, it is authentic human relationship that creates
the world. If we have relationship, we do not need reason.
(McSwite, 1997, p. 261)
Transformationists like Fox and Miller and McSwite combine critical theory epistemology with
utopian ontologies81 to create an agenda for Public Administration theory that has no room for
the positivist world of mainstream social science. In fact, the transformationist is explicitly antipositivist, to the point of demonizing those who would objectify the world and challenge the
legitimacy of human subjectivity and the unconscious. Unlike the alternativists who seek
epistemological diversity alongside positivism and normativists who desire greater value
commitment within the positivist social sciences, the transformationist position dismisses and
denigrates mainstream social science activity as inherently flawed and a key factor in the
dehumanization and alienation of modern life.
For example, Fox and Miller critique the use of positivist social science methodologies (e.g.,
surveys, panels) in developing solutions to the postmodern condition (Fox & Miller, 1995).
McSwite also regards such efforts as insufficient, and is particularly suspicious of efforts to
merely reform how we think about public administration. Typical is McSwite’s assessment of
“neo-institutionalism” which is “especially pernicious, in my view, because it appears to be
something new when in fact it is reactionary, a defensive holding action against the effects of the
wearing away of the epistemological foundations of the ideology of reason” (McSwite, 1997, p.
271).
The knowledge-gathering and theory-building functions of social science research are not high
on the agenda of the transformationists. Knowledge and theory are instead treated as tools,
intended to serve the needs of their respective utopian programs. This is especially evident in
the way McSwite approaches historical analysis. The use of historical knowledge for rhetorical
purposes, i.e. to persuade, is a fundamental and explicit part of McSwite’s methodology. Just as
political and intellectual histories have been used to suppress equally legitimate alternatives
(e.g., those of Antifederalists, Follett, Dewey) to the textbook versions perpetrated to enhance
the Man of Reason world view, so it can be used to subvert that perspective. But in taking this
approach, McSwite is subject to a variation of what Habermas terms “performative
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contradiction”82 – that is, McSwite’s rhetorical use of historical analysis simultaneously implies
legitimacy for that which it condemns and condemns that for which it claims legitimacy through
its application. In a sense, there is irony and justice in McSwite’s approach, but there are also
serious questions to be raised about the integrity of their presentation.
These and related problems have plagued postmodernists for decades, and often result in a
greater appreciation of the value of positivist standards in the social sciences (see Rosenau,
1992). While the transformationist perspective constantly reminds us of our desire for a
humane public administration and complementary development of a humanist Public
Administration community, its inherent shortcomings highlight the price we would pay – in
terms of knowledge accumulation, theory development, and (yes) disciplinary status – for
adopting a utopian stance.83
A Seat at the Social Science Table
One of the benefits of historicist thinking is the dirty little pleasure of engaging in “what if”
exercises. What if the South had won the Civil War? What if Hitler had not invaded the Soviet
Union? What if Truman had decided against using nuclear weapons? Or, for our purposes, what
if Simon, and not Waldo, had prevailed in the postwar debate in Public Administration? What
would the field have accomplished as a social science discipline rather than as a handmaiden to
professionalism?
I will resist pursuing this speculative game in detail, but it seems clear that the field would have
retained its autonomy relative to political science, although current ties would have been
stronger. The Woods and Watermans of the world would regard themselves as members of the
Public Administration community while suffering no intellectual or social discomfort in
attending Political Science Association meetings. Mainstream political science would have
developed a more deferential (rather than a dismissive) attitude toward Public
Administrationists during the 1960s. Waldo’s professional analogy to medicine would have been
replaced by one comparing the field with those who study international relations, and like their
international relations colleagues, public administration would have a distinct organization
(most likely separate from the American Society for Public Administration, and more like
today’s Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management) as well as a significant section
with the American Political Science Association (as it currently has).
But most important, as a social science, Public Administration’s gatekeepers would have been
“at the table” (figuratively, of course) in the half century of discussions about the standards for
social science research and what constitutes social science knowledge. From that perspective,
they would realize that the logical positivist bogeyman was just that – a figment of their
collective imaginations that could have sapped their energies in a decades-long tilt with
windmills while others engaged in the business of inquiry.
But the South did not win the Civil War, and in fact Public Administration has been tilting at the
logical positivist windmill for decades. It is not my intent to add a history of science or social
science to this already lengthy essay, but few would argue with the observation that logical
positivism’s day in the sun was a short one – if there was such a day at all. Among philosophers
of science, logical positivism remained a powerful theme, even as it was reconstructed and
adapted for use in the social sciences (see Kaplan, 1964). And there is no denying the impact of
behavioralism and other positivist approaches on the research agenda and publications in the
social sciences through the postwar era.
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Nevertheless, no one familiar with the individual social science disciplines can ignore the
continuous emergence of controversies regarding standards and methods of research. Division
and debate were (and are) as commonplace as the “urge” for consensus that inheres in each
discipline. Anthropology journals have been filled with discussions about alternative methods
and the ethics of research for decades (e.g., Ammerman, 1992; Despres, 1968; Earle & Preucel,
1987); leading psychologists have been raising significant questions about the appropriateness,
misuse, and bias of various mainstream approaches in the field (see Gergen, 1994a, 1994b;
Kagan, 1998); and sociologists and political scientists are continually rethinking their
“paradigms” and research methods in light of critiques generated by both traditionalists and
postmodernists (see Campbell, 1996; Giddens, 1979; Rosenau, 1992). Economics has not only
not escaped these debates, but has gone out of its way to honor those who “stir” the
methodological or epistemological pot – as in the cases of Nobel laureates Herbert Simon and
Milton Friedman (see, for example, McCloskey, 1994).
John R. Hall (1999) has provided a relevant view of the social sciences that is perhaps closer to
the historical reality. He approaches the social sciences as “cultures of inquiry” constantly
engaged in at least four ongoing “formative discourses” about the role of values, narratives,
theories and interpretations in the social sciences. These discourses are necessary because social
science inquiry is “an arena contested by alternative practices of inquiry – [i.e.,] relatively
conventionalized methodological approaches to the production of sociohistorical knowledge”
(Hall, 1999, p. 25).
Whether the endeavor is ethnomusicology or macroeconomics,
any practice of inquiry presupposes some stance about how to
theorize, and, similarly, about the ways that values, narrative, and
explanation or interpretation come into play. Formative
discourses are not types of inquiry; they are constituent elements
of it. Thus, the ability to carry out research depends on resolving
various problematics within different forms of discourse (such as
social theory), but the solution to a problematic within a given
form of discourse is not isolated. Instead, any resolution to issues
within one form of discourse becomes articulated resolutions to
problematics from other forms of discourse (e.g., theory with
narrative). Compositions that align resolutions to problematics
form multiple forms of discourse amount to practices of inquiry.
(Hall, 1999, p. 27)
Within the context of these discourses, logical positivism has at most served as an idealization
that generated reaction rather than submission to its tenets. Through these various and ongoing
discourses, social science has always been something quite different than the “model” which
caused so much angst among Public Administrationists for over five decades!
With their attention focused on the potential threat of value-less positivism, the leading
theorists in the Public Administration hardly had time to notice that the social science
disciplines had in fact moved toward a more open and diverse position on research standards.
The black-and-white distinctions between objectivism and relativism, between modern and
postmodern, between realism and constructivism have blurred rather than sharpened over time
in the social sciences – a fact to which Public Administration theorists seemed oblivious.
Instead, the field’s theorists began a subtle shift toward a more generalized conceptualization of
logical positivism in the form of “technical rationality.” Now the peril is not merely the
conscious effort to establish a value-neutral field; rather the danger is a spreading technocratic
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logic and conformity that the human psyche finds irresistible. And before you know it, it has
captured our souls as well as our bodies.84
The question for the field is not whether it can turn itself into a social science by doing research
that meets some perceived methodological standards (i.e., the reformist solution). Nor is a
solution found in the “diversity of approaches” prescription of the alternativists. Brewing up
some epistemological mix to study a social phenomenon poses a significant challenge that
demands more than implied by a call for multiple perspectives. Nor will the subjectivism of
either normativists or transformationists hold an answer to the future of the field. Focused as
they are on the ethics and ontological foundations of research respectively, both seek to judge
and direct knowledge development rather than promote knowledge accumulation or
understanding. And intentionally or not, both approaches raise the kinds of fundamental
intellectual and social challenges addressed by Popper in his critique of “holistic” or utopian
thinking (Popper, 1962a, 1962b, 1964).
What is required is a willingness on the part of the field’s gatekeepers to engage in the formative
discourses of the social sciences and to promote that engagement among other members of the
field through changes in standards of research and publication. This might require another
Administrative Behavior to pose a challenge to those fixated on the positivist devil, but this
time the iconoclastic author would be arguing on behalf of a social science more sensitive and
responsive to reflexive and emotional human beings as well as the complexities and chaos of
social life.
Such a social science has emerged over the past several decades in response to constant
criticisms and challenges. Among the list of “targets” in these ongoing discourses has been
methodological individualism (Gergen, 1994b), the search for “lawlike generalizations” (Elster,
1989, 1999), the behavioral assumptions associated with homo economicus (Douglas & Ney,
1998), etc. At the same time have come calls for greater focus on institutions, relationships,
reflexivity, and causal mechanisms. Topics previously avoided, especially the role of emotions
in social life (e.g., see Elster, 1999; Gergen, 1994b), are now regarded as high on the social
science agenda in several fields. And certain sources, data and methods previously dismissed as
unsuitable (i.e., not “scientific” enough) are gaining wider acceptance.85
What Public Administration will gain from engaging in the formative discourses of the social
sciences is more than merely a collective identity or higher status among their peers. The true
benefits will come in the form of contributing more to our knowledge and understanding of
those subjects that fall under the field’s purview. Despite the criticisms made in this essay,
Public Administrationists have a considerable amount of individual and collective intellectual
energy to offer in dealing with the many questions that remain on the vast and diverse social
science research agenda. Given the central role played by intellectual leaders and major
gatekeepers in perpetuating the failures of Public Administration theories, however, harnessing
that energy will require an upheaval in the field that is likely to be political as well as
paradigmatic. As the history of the Minnowbrook and Blacksburg movements indicate, this is no
easy challenge. Certainly, it will require more than polemics such as this. It demands the
emergence of an individual or group with Simon-like abilities to articulate both a challenge and
an alternative that would finally allow the field of Public Administration to assume the
disciplinary stance it surrendered after World War Two.
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Notes
1. This paper was originally prepared for and delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, September 2-5, 1999.
2. In this paper, I will use the now common convention, attributable to Waldo (see Waldo,
1968a, p. 443, note 1), of using capital letters to differentiate the academic side of the
subject from the practice of public administration itself.
3. This argument, therefore, is narrower than – and overlapping with – Stillman’s (1991).
In his superbly presented analysis, Stillman covers the identity crisis among scholars as
part of an overall historical pattern of themeless-ness and directionless-ness in both
practice and study of public administration.
4. For classic and controversial analysis of an academic “community,” see Bourdieu (1988).
5. E.g., see Smith (1997) and Gergen (1994a) on psychology and related behavioral
sciences; also see Matson (1964).
6. The imagery of “gatekeepers” builds upon a broader metaphor that regards those who
study Public Administration as forming a distinct community of scholars within
academe. The boundaries and membership of such community are “imagined” (see
Anderson, 1991, p. 5-7), a fact that makes them no less real or meaningful. Like other
academic and scientific communities, Public Administration has developed norms and
roles that helps sustain it even in the absence of a core paradigm, methodology, or clear
sense of identity. (On this point, see Polanyi (1964); for a postmodern perspective, see
Bourdieu [1988]). Among those who play gatekeeping roles are journal editors (see
Simon and Fyfe [1994]) and individuals who, through criticisms and the articulation of
theories, have the power to shape and define their fields (e.g., Calhoun (1995);
Gouldner (1970).
7. On psychology, see Smith (1997, chapter 14). Regarding political science, see Waldo
(1975) and Leonard (1995). For Public Administration, see Chandler (1987). It must be
stressed that I am focusing on the founding “myths,” rather than asserting that these
represent verifiable historical roots. In public administration, for example, credit can
also be given to the work of lesser known contributors than Woodrow Wilson, e.g.
Theodore Dwight Woolsey and Dorman B. Eaton (see Van Riper, 1987).
8. The first meeting of the Society was held in conjunction with an academic conference
(the December, 1939, meeting of the American Political Science Association) and its first
president was an academic (Dean William Mosher of Syracuse University).
9. See Stone (1982). Also see the brief comments in Egger (1975).
10. While this did not fit the pattern of the major social science associations, it did resemble
the coalition of practitioners, reformers, and academics that characterized the founding
of professional associations during the 19th and early 20th centuries (see Ross 1979).
11. See the now classic case of a debate between competing theories that challenged the
consensus surrounding quantum mechanics in physics in the 1920s and 1930s (Cassidy,
1992).
12. On the “disunity” of science, see Galison and Stump (1996).
13. By the late 1950s, there was some optimism left in the observation of Sayre about the
state of the field: “The post-war decade of the center and heterodoxy has not yet revealed
the clearer outlines of an emerging new body of comprehensive doctrine. But perhaps we
can anticipate some of the major components of the reformulation now in process. The
premises around which the new consensus [sic] – perhaps to become a new orthodoxy –
would seem to be forming…” (Sayre, 1958, p. 178-179)
14. Consider, for example, the careers of notables such as Samuel P. Huntington or Merle
Fainsod.
15. Simon and James G. March are the most prominent examples.
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16. This snobbery sometimes comes to the surface in the form of confrontations over the
distribution of awards or honors – as was the case in the 1980s when political scientist
Samuel P. Huntington engaged in a public, but ultimately losing, battle for membership
in the prestigious National Academy of Sciences (Cordes, 1988).
17. Dwight Waldo mentions this specific insult in a number of forums; see the discussions in
Charlesworth (1968).
18. Does such identification of differences make a difference? It seems to in terms of
research productivity standards and other evaluative norms (see Wanner, Lewis, &
Gregorio, 1981).
19. In both essays, Waldo bitterly notes that this was not merely a matter of choice on the
part of Public Administrationists. The field’s relevance and status within political science
was already significantly reduced in the eyes and actions of its colleagues. Start in 1962,
Public Administration was relegated to the “other” category in formal reports and
questionnaires issued by the American Political Science Association. But the most
explicit indicator was the “disappearance” of Public Administration as an organized
section in the 1967 program of APSA’s annual meeting (see Waldo 1968a, 1968b). For
responses to his concerns, see Sayre (1968) and Riggs (1968).
20. Waldo (1968b). A decade later, Waldo would use a narrower definition of “discipline”
than he applied in his 1968 comments (see Waldo 1980).
21. See critical discussions of the founding period in Ball (1995) and Leonard (1995).
22. There are, of course, many institutions where the Public Administration faculty remains
housed
within
political
science
departments
(see
http://www.naspaa.org/programs/index.html). However, anecdotal evidence indicates
that the relationships between Public Administration faculty and their political science
colleagues are often plagued by difficulties, particularly in questions related to tenure,
promotion, and other status issues.
23. An interesting indicator of this accomplishment is found in the jobs posting section of
The Chronicle of Higher Education where the field has a distinct status outside the
listings for social science and among those designated as “professional fields.”
24. The notion of a “discipline” is confusing as well as ambiguous to most of us. As Mark
Rutgers points out, its use in public administration has been troubled by both
philosophic and sociological meanings. My argument relies primarily on the sociological
type (see Rutgers, 1995).
25. He characterizes it as a belief that “the way toward the discovery of greater (or ‘true’)
knowledge…law in the application of modes of thought and methods of research which
had demonstrated their potency so effectively in such areas that has physics and biology”
(Waldo, 1975, p. 28).
26. See Newland (1994) for insightful comments on the efforts of “public management”
scholars to see themselves as a discipline by stressing their separateness from public
administration.
27. This perspective is drawn from the sociology and history of science literatures where
stress has been placed on the role of community norms and values in shaping and
directing knowledge accumulation. A classic presentation of this perspective is found in
Merton (1957); for a more recent study, see Shapin (1994).
28. Different sources note different dates for the Committee’s formation: Roberts (1994)
reports it as 1926; Stone and Stone (1975) put it at 1928; and, Egger (1975) has its
formation as 1934.
29. For an overview of the Committee’s activities, see Roberts (1994).
30. E.g., Gulick and Urwick (1937). Earlier attitudes toward applying “scientific” methods to
the study of public administration were reflected in the comments by William F.
Willoughby in a survey of research in political science published in 1933. After noting the
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“enormous amount of research” focused on the work of administrative agencies by
research institutes and bureaus as well as other institutions, Willoughby was not quite
ready to label these efforts as “scientific,” although he was willing to call them
“analogous:” “While it may be that public administration is not entitled to the
designation of a science, as that term is employed in respect to the natural sciences,
studies in this field have gone far enough to establish that there are at least fundamental
principles, of more or less general application, analogous to those characterizing any
science, which must be observed if the end of administration, efficiency in operation, is
to be secured” (Willoughby, 1933, p. 21). Even such limited claims to scientific status
were subject to severe criticisms (see Hyneman, 1939).
31. For a contemporary and critical view of social science research applied to industrial
settings prior to the 1930s, see Gillespie (1991).
32. On the significance of the publication of Administrative Behavior, see Landau (1972).
33. In his autobiography, Simon writes of weekly graduate student gatherings where the
philosophy of science was the primary topic of conversation. “Logical positivism was the
moment, perhaps exclusive, religion in this group, and we took turns talking about our
special interests or projects” (Simon, 1991, p. 74-75). Ironically, one of Simon’s major
contributions to the study of decision-making – i.e., the inherent limits to human
rationality – undermines the very foundation of the logical positivism he builds upon
(see Wilson, 1998).
34. In his autobiography, for example, Simon recalls a problem he had applying Carnap’s
views to his initial work on the thesis that would become Administrative Behavior – a
problem he shared with Carnap who “tried to show me that I was mistaken. However, in
his 1942 book on semantics, he retreated from his earlier position in exactly the direction
I had pointed” (Simon, 1991, p. 54).
35. See the discussion of Merriam’s perspective in Leiserson (1975).
36. In his autobiography, Simon notes that a picture of Barnard hangs in his study, next to
those of his father, Clarence Ridley (a much-admired colleague and co-author), Charles
Merriam (his mentor), Franklin Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, and Albert Einstein
(Simon, 1991).
37. There are at least ten citations in the index to Barnard.
38. “[The reliance of Barnard’s] administrative theory on common sense was not entirely
acceptable to me. Systematic observation and experimentation were badly needed in this
field to ever become scientific. Until someone build a satisfactory theoretical framework,
it would not be clear what kinds of empirical studies were called for” (Simon, 1991, p.
73).
39. Waldo brings some clarity to this point when he reflects on Simon’s work some twenty
years later. While Administrative Behavior represented one of the most critical
“refutations” of the dominant ideologies of the time in Public Administration (see also
Dahl, 1947), in many respects it was also a “conservative” work that gave priority to
bringing valid scientific methods to the so-called science of administration. Rather than
being regarded as a radical perspective that threatened to alter the world of
administration, Simon’s work might have been perceived as a much-needed approach
that would provide more realistic and useful knowledge (see Waldo, 1968a).
40. “My rearing and education disposed me to the soft side: to human us approach to social
science and to a suspicion of all philosophies and methods that offered Truth. But I could
hardly ignore the transformations wrought by modern science and technology; and I
acknowledged that the claims made on behalf of science for further knowledge and
control deserve to be heard and, if judged valid, heeded” (Waldo, 1984, p. xlix).
41. In fact, many in the scientific community though Northrop went too far in his views of
what science could accomplish. At one of the early Macy Foundation conferences held
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between 1946 and 1953, Northrop “proposed that the idea of ‘the good’ be based on
science. He did not get very far. Most of these scientists present agreed with Einstein’s
view that ‘science cannot create ends and, even less, instill them in human beings;
science, at most, can supply the means by which to attain certain ends…’” Several
months later, Northrop would present a paper at a meeting of scientists and
philosophers titled “The Scientific Method for Determining Normative Social Theory of
the Ends of Human Action” (Heims, 1993, p. 267).
42. Waldo (1984) quotes Northrop on this point.
43. On this particular point, Waldo cites Northrop’s critique of economic theory (see Waldo,
1984) and uses it to criticize Stene’s attempt to develop a rational theory of
administrative statics.
44. Waldo makes several somewhat uncritical references to Simon’s work with Ridley in The
Administrative State, as well as a very positive citation of Simon’s 1946 Public
Administration Review article on the “Proverbs of Administration” (see Waldo, 1984).
45. For a different perspective on the Simon/Waldo debate, see Harmon (1995).
46. Having described this essay as polemical and rhetorical, I could hide my
oversimplifications of history behind those characterizations. However, I would be
remiss not to point out a very significant, third major contender in the post-war Public
Administration debate: the political realists who launched direct assaults on the idealism
implied in the politics/administration dichotomy. Perhaps best known for leading this
attack on the prewar orthodoxy were Paul Appleby and Norton Long.
47. In the introduction to the second edition of Administrative Behavior, Simon takes note
of his response to Waldo quoted above, characterizing his views in that 1952 reply as set
forth “accurately if somewhat too tartly…” (Simon, 1957, p. xxxiv).
48. See also comments on Simon’s role in Lowi (1992).
49. For a collection of most of those articles through 1993, see White and Adams (1994b).
50. The phrase is mine, but the sentiment is more widespread (see White, Adams, &
Forrester, 1996).
51. Sayre’s position on this issue is well known among those associated with Columbia
University during his tenure there. White’s views came in the form of a letter in which he
noted that the study of administration in the university should be “intended primarily as
a means of understanding the nature of government and its operations” as opposed to a
focus on the application of knowledge to practical situations (see Waldo, 1968a, p. 445).
52. I attribute this comment to Professor Kenneth J. Meier. When asked to verify the
comment (personal communication, July 14, 1999), Meier could not recall having made
such a statement (“I don’t remember saying this, but I could have”), but expressed a
willingness to accept attribution in his capacity as the “Yogi Berra” of our field.
53. Roger Smith notes that the practice of social scientific research based on methods drawn
from the natural sciences was already well underway – at least in behaviorist psychology
– by the time logical positivism became well known (see Smith, 1997; also see Matson,
1964).
54. Anecdotally, early in the Rosenbloom editorship, when Public Administration Review
did publish an article that might otherwise have found a home in one of the more
mainstream social science publications, we received a strongly worded complaint from
one of the more prominent members of the field. That sharp critique certainly did not
change Rosenbloom’s attitude toward publishing similar pieces, but the lack of similar
submissions did. You cannot publish what is not submitted, and what is or is not
submitted has more to do with perceptions of the field than the policies of any editorial
board.
55. Compare with Stillman (1995).
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56. For the classic argument supporting axiomatic theories, see von Mises (1944). For an
assessment of the use of formal models to study bureaucracy, see Bendor (1990). The use
of such models by members of the mainstream Public Administration community has
been limited.
57. E.g., Lowi’s (1992) statement that “[t]raditional public administration was almost driven
out of the APSA by the work of a single, diabolical mind, that of Herbert A. Simon” (p. 4).
58. There are, of course, exceptions, e.g. the various examinations of published and
dissertation research (see White & Adams, 1994a) and opinion pieces such as Meier and
Stewart (1987).
59. Among those who do “just do it,” many are doing it in journals outside the Public
Administration community’s mainstream publications. In doing so, they reinforce the
isolation of the field by assuming identities as political scientists or policy analysts. The
one notable exception (there may be others) is Gregory Lewis of Georgia State
University. Not only does he “do it,” but he does it almost entirely within the field’s
mainstream publications. According to his posted list of “recent publications” (found at:
http://www.gsu.edu/~padgbl/vitae.html), he has published seventeen articles in the
leading peer-reviewed Public Administration journals – most (if not all) using positivist
methods and research standards.
60. The classical expression of this position was made by phenomenologist Alfred Schutz in
a 1954 response to empiricist Ernest Nagel’s critique of Weberian methodology:
I agree with Professor Nagel that all empirical knowledge involves
discovery through processes of controlled inference, and that it
must be statable in propositional forms and capable of being
verified by anyone who is prepared to make the effort to do so
through observations – although I do not believe, as Professor
Nagel does, that this observation has to be sensory in the precise
meaning of this term. Moreover, I agree with him that “theory”
means in all empirical sciences the explicit formulation of
determinate relations between a set of variables in terms of which
a fairly extensive class of empirically ascertainable regularities can
be explained. Furthermore, I agree wholeheartedly with his
statement that neither the fact that these regularities have in the
social sciences a rather narrowly restricted universality, nor the
fact that they permit prediction only to a rather limited extent,
constitutes a basic difference between the social and the natural
sciences, since many branches of the latter show the same
features. (Schutz, 1954, p. 260)
61. Mainstream social science has not been indifferent to these epistemological challenges,
and one finds a variety of strategies to deal with the resulting disciplinary discomfort.
Some, following the lead of Karl Popper, have developed “local epistemologies” –
essentially assuming the existence of an analytically comprehensible “reality.” Others
have taken a “conventionalist” approach by accepting the fact that science is a social
institution through which we accumulate knowledge. Still others (typically associated
with Habermas, despite his claim that he is not engaged in such a project) have
embarked on attempts to develop a new epistemological foundation that would
integrate social science and humanist/historicist perspectives. For a survey of the issues
and various efforts to deal with them (see Hall, 1990).
62. For a general collection of works associated with this perspective in the social sciences,
see Morgan (1983).
63. For critiques, see Jones (1998) and Shankman (1984).
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64. There are, of course, alternativists who demonstrate less flexibility in their solutions to
the epistemological issues. Robert B. Denhardt, for example, acknowledges three
distinct “models” characterizing the study of public organizations: the rational model,
reflecting “positive social science” and its emphasis on control; the interpretive model,
with its stress on phenomenological “understanding”; and the critical model, based on
critical social theory and stressing a commitment to emancipatory “praxis.”
Although mainstream theory [i.e., the rational model] presents
itself as the only available theory, many who have contributed to
the intellectual and political heritage of public organizations have
suggested alternative approaches. Completeness in the study of
public organization requires that we be attentive to the full range
of approaches available to us....
[However, in] my view, it is toward administrative praxis [i.e., the
critical model] that practitioners as theorists must guide their
theory buildings and their actions. (Denhardt, 1993, p. 232-233)
65. In many respects, historical analyses in Public Administration are closely related to the
normativist perspective discussed below. Rohr, for example, is a prominent member of
the Blacksburg Manifesto Movement, and Rosenbloom is a leading advocate for a view
that promotes U.S. constitutional values in the development of Public Administration
theory. Nevertheless, the standards of historical research are taken seriously by these
scholars, and they are less subject to the criticism (which I apply to the normativists)
that research is used to persuade rather than enlighten.
66. See Herzog and Claunch (1997) for a complementary analysis to Hummel’s. Michael
Harmon is the other notable writer in this area. His emphasis on “action theory” is
deeply rooted in the phenomenological tradition (see Harmon & Mayer, 1986; also see
Harmon 1990, 1998).
67. This is an argument Adams (1992) made several years earlier and is repeated in chapter
2 of UEA.
68. Compare with Stivers (1995) and Schacher (1995).
69. For a brief overview of the critical approach, see Denhardt (1981).
70. Nineteenth-century physicists believed that ether was a necessary medium for the
propagation of electromagnetic radiation. “Ether theory” was abandoned after
Einstein’s special theory of relativity gained wide acceptance.
71. See an overview of this controversy and the Weberian position in Hall (1999).
72. This is a personal observation drawn from my experience as managing editor of Public
Administration Review. Editor-in-chief David H. Rosenbloom had an “open door”
policy in regard to questions of acceptable research, and we informally engaged in
efforts to generate more mainstream social science submissions. With the exception of
one or two submissions each year, we were unable to attract relevant work from outside
the Public Administration community. This despite a growing body of mainstream
social science scholarship focused on public administration and bureaucracy.
73. Donald N. McCloskey, for example, contends that all scientific research is rhetorical.
“The rhetorical concern,” he argues, “is how we really do convince each other, not ‘what
is true according to abstract methods.’ Abstract Methods are necessary for the unlimited
conversation of Ultimate Truth. Rhetoric is necessary for courts of law and conferences
of scientists, places in which the bell rings and the decision must somehow be made.
How they really do convince each other in the here and now is the main concern of
scientists; they could care less what is true at the Second Coming according to abstract
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Methods; they want to persuade, to bring a particular debate to a conclusion”
(McCloskey, 1994, p. 106).
74. E.g., the “public management” research agenda is explicitly prescriptive as well as
normative (see Bozeman, 1994; see also Newland, 1994).
75. I am obviously avoiding labeling the normativists “authoritarian,” although others make
an interesting case that there are authoritarian propensities present in such subjective
approaches (see Geuras & Garofalo, 1996).
76. White and McSwain (1983) cite an earlier paper by Larry Kirhart and White.
77. The use of the term “transformationalist” in the present paper is not intended to reflect
White and McSwain’s use of the label “transformational theory” to describe their
approach. Theirs is derived from Jungian analysis; my use of the term is intended to be
descriptive of the common agenda characterizing a number of Public Administration
theorists.
78. Which has not stopped such attempts (see Best & Kellner, 1991; Lemert, 1997).
79. Drucker retains his optimistic view of postmodernism today (see Drucker, 1999).
80. Compare with Lemert (1997).
81. See Geuras and Garofalo (1996) for a related argument.
82. Such a contradiction occurs when an analyst makes “performative use of something he
expressly denies” (Habermas, 1990, p. 129).
83. I am not addressing here an even greater potential cost to the utopian stance, i.e. its
connection to the development of closed and authoritarian systems (see Popper, 1962a,
1962b). Again, it is ironic that approaches emerging from postmodern critiques of
“totalizing” cultures are themselves subject to the same kind of utopian thinking that
they are so good at criticizing.
84. If you believe this characterization is unfair, I suggest a reading of Unmasking
Administrative Evil (UAE), discussed above. I also recommend that you compare the
narrative in UEA with the plot of a movie released at about the same time as the book:
Fallen with Denzel Washington as a detective who is pitted against an evil force that is
able to maintain itself by passing from body to body through touch.
85. Textual analysis, once dismissed as relevant only for the humanities, has regained some
stature in the social sciences as analysts have turned to novels and proverbs and
classical texts as sources. Again, see the work of Elster, Gergen, and others.
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